CHAPTER 6

The Values of Buddhist Epistemology

In introducing this book I began with a discussion of its subject matter (*abhidheya*), my reasons for writing it, including what I hoped to accomplish in doing so (*prayojana*), and how I hoped to achieve these ends (*sambandha*).[1] It seems appropriate, therefore, to conclude with how Ratnakīrti himself might answer such questions about his own work and, more specifically, with how he understood its value. My discussion of Ratnakīrti's interest in the Naiyāyikas' argument for the existence of Īśvara (in chapters 2–3) and my analysis of the broad range of philosophical resources that he relies upon in criticizing it (in chapters 3–5) reveal how Ratnakīrti practiced philosophy. By describing the conceptual resources that he uses to fashion and respond to arguments and analyzing the language and style in which he argues, I have tried to provide a picture of how Ratnakīrti

1. For a discussion of how Sanskrit philosophers themselves theorized the ideas expressed in this sentence, and discussed the terms "subject matter" (*abhidheya*), "purpose" (*prayojana*), and "relation between the two" (*sambandha*), see Kumārila's ŚV, *Pratijñāsūtra* 11–25, where the latter two terms are discussed. For a discussion of all three in the work of a Buddhist epistemologist see Dharmottara's NBṬ 5.01–16.02 and Arcaṭa's HBṬ 1.18–3.03. For an excellent discussion of this issue, and numerous additional references, see Funayama 1995.

engaged with his opponents, both explicitly and implicitly. In the texts discussed in these chapters, however, Ratnakīrti does not tell us what he hoped to gain in critically engaging his opponents in this way and, more generally, how he understood the value of philosophy, as defined by his work.[2] In this chapter I want to argue that Ratnakīrti's understanding of the value of philosophy, and epistemology more specifically, is implicit in his practice of it—a practice that both subtly gestures to, and draws from, a "two-dimensional framework of value" that he shares with his text tradition.[3]

This two-dimensional framework of value is defined in terms of the two kinds of rationality that I hope to show are evident in Ratnakīrti's work, namely, epistemic rationality and instrumental rationality.[4] On my use of the term, "epistemic rationality" is the kind of rationality that one displays when one's belief "that *p*" is based on reasons that are taken to be neither defeated nor undermined. Epistemic rationality is also displayed when one refrains from believing "that *p*" on the basis of reasons that are taken to be defeated or undermined. Given this, "epistemic reasons" are often thought to have categorical normative force—that is, to be binding on any rational agent, regardless of that agent's interests or goals.[5] Many of the reasons that Ratnakīrti and his opponents appeal to in their debate about the Īśvara-inference seem to be epistemic in this sense. In contrast, "instrumental rationality" is the kind of rationality that one displays when one takes the means to one's ends. Thus, "instrumental reasons" are often thought to have hypothetical force—that is, to be binding on a rational agent who possesses the goal or

2. For an excellent study of such questions in the work of Śāntarakṣita (ca. 725–788) and his "commentator," Kamalaśīla (ca. 740–795), see McClintock 2002: esp. chap. 1, section 4; chap. 2; and chap. 6. For an interpretation of how the Buddhist epistemologist Mokṣākaragupta might answer such questions see Griffiths 1999b. For additional references to relevant work on the Buddhist epistemological tradition, see Funayama 1995, Kellner 2004b, Krasser 2004, and the references contained therein. See also Eltschinger 2007b.

3. For more on the idea of a "text tradition" see McCrea and Patil (forthcoming).

4. For a discussion of these, and an extended argument against the reduction of epistemic rationality to instrumental rationality, see Kelly 2003, where he argues against the idea that epistemic rationality is simply a species of instrumental rationality—that is, instrumental rationality in the service of some cognitive goal. For a typology of different "varieties" of rationality see Plantinga 1993a:132–137, and for an argument against the philosophical utility of "rationality" see Goldman 1986:27.

5. See Kelly 2003:614.

goals in question.[6] In much of this chapter, I am going to focus on Ratnakīrti's goals and will be concerned primarily with instrumental reasons. What I am most interested in, however, is the relationship between such reasons and specifically epistemic ones. Associated with each kind of reason is also a kind of value that I will refer to as "epistemic value" and "instrumental value," respectively.[7] It is these two kinds of value that define the two-dimensional framework of value that I will argue is present in Ratnakīrti's work.

In much of what follows I will be arguing that for Ratnakīrti philosophy is of instrumental value, since it is indispensable for those who seek to understand the nature of the Buddhist path and to make progress along it. My argument in support of this conclusion has three parts. In section 1 I will briefly discuss the philosophical goals and ideals of the Buddhist epistemological tradition, as understood by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti (and some of their commentators), in order to show how from the very beginning the tradition was methodologically self-conscious and reflected upon the value of philosophy. In section 2 I will show that Ratnakīrti himself shared the framework of value that was constructed by his text tradition. In section 3 I will discuss how Ratnakīrti's teacher, Jñānaśrīmitra, incorporated these goals and ideals into a framework in which philosophy as an intellectual practice and philosophy as a form of religious education were brought together. In the final two sections of this chapter I will show how all of this relates to epistemic value and the two-dimensional framework of value described above.

1. Foundational Figures and Foundational Texts

1.1. Dignāga

From the opening verse of Dignāga's (ca. 480–540) *Compendium of the Sources of Knowledge* (*Pramāṇasamuccaya*)—the text upon which the Buddhist epistemological tradition is founded—the tradition's self-consciousness

6. For a discussion of the terms "hypothetical" and "categorical" in a similar context see Papineau 2003.

7. See Foley 1987:11–12, where the link between kinds of reasons and kinds of value is also made.

regarding the role of philosophy, and especially epistemology, is evident.[8] In this opening verse, and his own commentary on it, Dignāga very clearly explains that he composed his work in order to refute his opponents' views on the instruments of valid awareness (*pramāṇa*) and to establish his own.[9] He explains further that this is an important task, because there is a great deal of confusion about these instruments and many competing claims have been made about them. Since our account of *what* we know depends upon our account of *how* we know, Dignāga goes on to say that it is important to argue against mistaken views of these instruments, in order to show one's opponents that what they conclude on the basis of them is also mistaken. Establishing correct

8. Dignāga is said to have been born into a Brahmin family from Kāñci in South India and to have lived and worked, at least for a time, at the Buddhist monastic and educational complex of Nālanda, which was located in North India, in the modern state of Bihar. For more on what we know of Dignāga's life see Frauwallner 1933 and Hattori 1968:1–11, and the references contained therein. For a helpful discussion of Nālanda see Mullens 1994:49–68. With the discovery of two Sanskrit manuscripts of Jinendrabuddhi's commentary on the PS, it is now possible to reconstruct large parts of Dignāga's PS and PSV. As this work is published, it is sure to revolutionize our understanding of Dignāga and the history of Buddhist epistemology in India. See Steinkellner et al. 2005:xvii–lii for a discussion of these manuscripts and Katsura 2004 and Katsura and Steinkellner 2004 for a taste of what is to come with regard to important elements in Dignāga's theory of inferential reasoning.

9. PS 1.1: "With great reverence to the teacher who exists as a source of knowledge; who seeks the well-being of the world; who is accomplished; and who is our protector, I compose this *Compendium*, on the basis of my own thoughts, which are scattered about here and there, in order to establish the sources of knowledge" (*pramāṇabhūtāya jagaddhitaiṣine praṇamya śāstre sugatāya tāyine | pramāṇasiddhyai svamatāt samuccayaḥ kariṣyate viprasṛtād ihaikataḥ*). PSV 1.10–1.13: "With great reverence to the teacher who has such qualities, I will compose this *Compendium of the Sources of Knowledge* by bringing together material from my other works, such as the *Nyāyamukha*, in order to reject the sources of knowledge of my rivals and promote my own, since an awareness of what can be known depends upon the sources of knowledge, and there are many competing claims made about them" (see Hattori 1968:23–24, Kellner 2004b:148) (*evaṃguṇaṃ śāstāraṃ praṇamya pramāṇasiddhyai svapraṇebhyo nyāyamukhādibhya iha samāhṛtya pramāṇasamuccayaḥ kariṣyate parapramāṇapratiṣedhāya svapramāṇaguṇodbhāvanāya ca, yasmāt pramāṇāyattā prameyapratipattir bahavaś cātra vipratipannāḥ*). Also see PST 20.14–22.13. For an extremely important discussion of the phrase that I have translated as "exists as a source of knowledge" (*pramāṇabhūta*) see the excellent discussion in Krasser 2001 and the references contained therein. For a discussion of why Dignāga and Śākyabuddhi interpret the "as" in this phrase to mean "is," while Prajñākaragupta takes it to mean "like," see Kellner 2004b, and for a somewhat different interpretation, Iwata 2004. For a discussion of the variety of ways in which the term "accomplished" (*sugata*) is interpreted by Dignāga see Hattori 1968:23.

views about the instruments of valid awareness is, therefore, also a way of establishing what is in fact the case.

From Dignāga's rather brief remarks in the opening section of his *Compendium*, it is clear that his work has a dual purpose: it is meant to "reject the instruments of others" (*parapramāṇapratiṣedha*)—and thereby reject the conclusions that they draw on the basis of them—and to "make public the virtues of one's own account of the instruments" (*svapramāṇaguṇodbhāvana*)—and thereby support one's own conclusions.[10] This dual purpose is also explicit in the structure of Dignāga's text: each chapter includes both an account of his own position and a detailed refutation of rival views.[11] Implicit in his introductory remarks is also his view about the value of epistemology. From what Dignāga says in the opening section of his *Compendium*, what seems to be of value is being right, both about how one knows and what one knows. And, as Dignāga suggests, it is through critical reflection upon the instruments of valid awareness that one is able to determine this. Dignāga also makes it clear that this is not simply a personal affair: it is essential to his

10. In the following passage Dignāga's own words are printed underlined, while his commentator Jinendrabuddhi's are not. My reason for citing this passage is to support my point that built into Diguāga's "dual purpose" are not just the "instruments," or sources of knowledge, but also the "conclusions," or objects of knowledge/valid awareness.

PST ms. B258b1–4 (as cited in Krasser 2004:141 n. 32): "It is not the case that only in chapters such as the 'Investigation of Nyāya' are the objects of knowledge refuted, since it is seen that in this [section] too they are [refuted] by implication. . . . In [response to the question]—But why can't this be known through perception?—he says, 'things are imagined by them,' etc. Since, in virtue of their being imperceptible, the existence of things such as the material basis for the world, the passive principle of consciousness, space, time, and inherence are established on the basis of a reason property, they can be known only through [such] reasoning. 'It is not the case that it is worth touching' means 'It isn't worthy of thought.' And he has explained the ways in which they do not stand up to thought. 'For this reason' means 'since.' Thus reasoning cannot be the basis for an investigation. Therefore it should be known that it is definitely the case that here too the objects of knowledge, which are supposed to be known through reasoning, are refuted by implication" (*na kevalaṃ nyāyaparīkṣādiṣu prameyapratiṣedhaḥ kṛtaḥ, ihāpy arthataḥ kṛta iti darśanāt. {sarveṣāṃ cetyādi}. kasmāt punaḥ pratyakṣagamyaṃ na bhavatīty āha—tatparikalpitapadārthānāṃ ityādi. pradhānapuruṣadikkālasamavāyādīnāṃ apratyakṣatayā liṅgenāstitvavyavasthāpanāt tarkagamyatvam. na vimardakṣama iti na vicāram arha ity arthaḥ, yathā ca vicāraṃ na sahate, tathā pratipāditam, ata iti. yasmād evaṃ na parīkṣākṣamas tarkaḥ, tasmāt tadgamyasya prameyasyāpy arthataḥ pratiṣedho 'tra kṛta eva veditavya iti*).

11. For an introduction to this text and a discussion of its organizing principles see Hattoti 1968 and Hayes 1988.

work, as he understands it, to argue against those who disagree with him and, as we will see, to convince them that their views are mistaken and that his are not. Why any of this should be of value, and what special significance if any it has for a Buddhist philosopher, is not discussed by Dignāga here.

In the concluding sections of his *Compendium*, however, Dignāga explicitly links the dual purpose of his text to the teachings of the Buddha, and thereby explains further why this way of "being right" is itself of value.[12] He says that his opponents' views on the instruments of valid awareness, and the conclusions that they draw on the basis of them, are not well-established (*durvihita*) and so are distant from (*viprakṛṣṭa*) the real nature of *dharma* as taught by the Buddha. He also explains that it is because their conclusions do not stand up to critical analysis—and instead are transformed and altered by it—that they are so distant. This implies that what makes something well-established is the degree to which it can withstand critical philosophical analysis, and further that being able to withstand such analysis is an indicator of proximity to *dharma*. But, as Dignāga (and the tradition before him) also points out, the real nature of *dharma* is not itself accessible to such analysis (*atarkagocara*).[13] As a result, his purpose is not (and cannot be) to

12. PSṬ ms. B258b4ff. For quoted fragments (*pratīka*) from PS/PSV see Krasser 2004:131, nn. 10, 11, 15, where he quotes and translates the passage. What follows is based on Krasser's translation. The Tibetan text is Kanakavarman's translation (PSV/no. 5702 of the Peking edition of the Tibetan canon, 176b8–177a2): "I composed this [work] in order to turn those who adhere to the views of non-Buddhists away from them, since they are without essence because the sources of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and their objects (*prameya*) [as taught by non-Buddhists] are not properly fixed (*durvihitatvena*). However, by just this (*iyatā*), I do not expect them to enter in to the teaching of the Tathāgata, since his *dharma* is not within the realm of reasoning. But those who have turned away (*vyāvṛttās tu*) [from the views of non-Buddhists] can more easily understand [the *dharma*] after hearing it, since it is very far [from their views] and close to his (*viprakṛṣṭāntaratvāt*)" (*tshad ma kun las btus par yaṅ | tshad ma daṅ gźal bya ñe bar brjod pa ñid kyis mu stegs pa 'i 'dod pa sñiṅ po med pa 'i phyir | der źen pa rnams ldog pa 'i don du 'di brtsams pa yin gyi | 'di tsam gyis de bźin gśegs pa 'i bstan pa la gźug pa 'i don du ni ma yin te | de 'i chos ni rtog ge 'i yul ma yin pa 'i phyir ro || ldog pa las ni ston pa 'i chos ñid thos nas 'bad pa med par rtogs par 'gyur te | bar du ma bskal ba 'i phyir ro*). It is worth noting that according to Jinendrabuddhi this section—which is quoted by Bu ston Rin chen grub in his *History of Buddhism* (*chos 'byun*)—states Dignāga's "secondary"/"more distant" (*pyavahita*) purpose, while his "primary"/"immediate" (*sākṣāt*) purpose is indicated in PS 1.1. For a very careful analysis of this passage see Krasser 2004:131–135. As Krasser notes, the passage is also translated in Obermiller 1931:46.

13. For a very helpful list of such passages see Krasser 2004:139 n. 28.

teach his opponents the *dharma* itself, but rather to turn them away from their false views so that it will be easier for them to eventually realize it. The reason for critically analyzing the teaching of the Buddha is to ensure that it is understood correctly and to show that, unlike the teachings of those who oppose or misunderstand the Buddha, it stands up to philosophical analysis. Even though what is established through such analysis is not *dharma* itself, it is nevertheless conducive for realizing it one day.

In his commentary on this section of Dignāga's text, Jinendrabuddhi (ca. 750–800) confirms this reading of Dignāga and states explicitly what is otherwise only implicit in Dignāga's own words. Jinendrabuddhi explains that Dignāga's reference to "philosophical analysis" is a synecdoche for conventionally valid sources of knowledge, i.e., perception and inferential reasoning.[14] He also says that the kinds of things that non-Buddhists think can be established through philosophical analysis, such as the soul, cannot stand up to such analysis, since such things do not exist as these non-Buddhists suppose.[15] In contrast, the kinds of things established by Buddhists, such as

14. PSṬ ms. B258b6–7 (as cited in Krasser 2004:135 n. 18): "Thus Dignāga says: 'Because the Buddha's *dharma* is not accessible to reasoning.' The reference to 'reasoning' is as a synecdoche for the conventional sources of knowledge. What this means is that since the Buddha's *dharma*—which each individual seeks to know—is an object of only the ultimate source of knowledge, it is not an object of the conventional ones" (*ity āha, taddharmasyātarkagocaratvāt. tarkagrahaṇaṃ vyāvahārikapramāṇopalakṣaṇārtham. lokottarasyaiva hi pramāṇasya viṣayo bhagavato dharmaḥ pratyātmavedyaḥ, na vyāvahārikasyety arthaḥ*).

15. PSṬ ms. B259b2–6 (as cited in Krasser 2004:134 n.16), where he suggests that the underlined words are from Dignāga's verse. Here is the "verse" extracted from the context of the commentarial passage: "Those who seek the essence of *dharma* by way of reasoning have fallen far from the Buddha's teachings. Still, the defining features of the Buddha's *dharma* should be investigated, since perhaps they may undergo change." Here is the passage in full: "Because they have set out on the wrong path, he says, 'But, they have fallen very far.' Those who investigate the nature of *dharma* by the path of reasoning have fallen very far from the teaching of the Buddha, since the nature of *dharma* is not an object of reasoning. Even though this is the case, he says, 'Still the defining features of the Buddha's *dharma* should be investigated, since perhaps it may undergo change'—like the things conceived of by non-Buddhists. He said that this means that although they are accepted as being the objects of reasoning, the kinds of things that are critically reflected upon through reasoning by non-Buddhists, such as the soul and the like, 'undergo change' in the sense that they do not remain as they were established in a philosophical text. The teachings (*dharma*) that are made known by the Buddha are of the opposite nature: [their nature] is selflessness and the like, which does not 'change' when it is critically reflected upon. This means that it is apprehended in itself, just as it appears through a conventional [source of knowledge]. Therefore,

selflessness (*nairātmya*), can withstand philosophical analysis, in the sense that what is known on the basis of the instruments of valid awareness as understood by Buddhists is never defeated. He also explains that even though *dharma* itself is inaccessible to philosophical analysis, things that are known through such analysis can help one to realize it.

Dignāga thus identifies the analysis of the instruments of valid awareness as the primary purpose of his *Compendium* and stakes out a position as to why this is of value. He says that by exposing mistakes in rival accounts of these instruments and establishing one's own position it is possible to turn one's opponents toward the *dharma*, which despite being inaccessible to such analysis can nevertheless be approached through it. It is important to keep in mind four features of Dignāga's account: (1) the dual purpose of his text; (2) his suggestion that being right is of value in that it brings one closer to *dharma*; (3) the claim that *dharma* itself is inaccessible to philosophical analysis; and (4) his conviction that despite this fact philosophical analysis is conducive to one day realizing *dharma*. These four themes are taken up in various ways by Dignāga's successor, Dharmakīrti, and, as I will argue, are clearly present in Ratnakīrti's own work.

1.2. Dharmakīrti

Dignāga's successor, Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660), is arguably the most influential Buddhist philosopher in Indian philosophical history (and among the most important Sanskrit philosophers).[16] In his works, Dharmakīrti picks up on each of the four themes discussed above, as does the extensive commentarial tradition on his *Ascertainment of the Sources of Knowledge* (*Pramāṇaviniścaya*) and his *Commentary on the Compendium of the Sources of Knowledge* (*Pramāṇavārttika*).[17]

In the introductory verse of his *Ascertainment of the Sources of Knowledge*, Dharmakīrti explains that he has composed the text in order to teach those who do not already know that in order to consistently acquire what is helpful (*hita*) and avoid what is unhelpful (*ahita*) it is necessary to know what correct/valid awareness (*samyagjñāna*) really is.[18] What is emphasized in this verse is the close connection between a correct account of the instruments of valid awareness and what is helpful, and incorrect accounts of these instruments and what is unhelpful. That there is a direct relationship between valid awareness and what we take to have value—that is, what we take to be helpful or unhelpful—is clearly expressed, as is Dharmakīrti's pedagogical intent. How this relates to the teachings of the Buddha is made clear in a passage that concludes the first chapter of his *Ascertainment*.[19]

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although reasoning cannot have ultimate truth as its object, still, in teaching [us about] a thing as it is established in its generic form, it is helps [us to] realize what is really the case. This is what is taught" (*sudūranaṣṭās tv iti, unmārgapravṛttatvāt. sudūraṃ naṣṭās te munīndraśāsanāt, ye tarkapathena dharmatāṃ niścinvanti, tasyā atarkaviṣayatvāt. yady apy etad evaṃ tathāpi tathāgatadharmalakṣaṇaṃ parīksyatāṃ yady upayāti vikriyāṃ tirthikaparikalpitapadārthavat. etad uktaṃ bhavati, tarkaviṣayatvenābhyupagatā api tīrthikair ātmādayaḥ padārthās tarkeṇa vicāryamāṇā vikriyante, yathā śāstre teṣāṃ vyavasthāpitās tathā nāvatiṣṭhanta ity arthaḥ. tathāgatapraveditadharmāṇām aviparītah svabhāvo nairātmyādir vicāryamāṇo na vikriyate, yathā darśito vyāvahārikeṇātmanā tathaivopalabhyata ity arthaḥ. etena yady api tarkaḥ paramārthaviṣayo na bhavati, tathāpi yathāvasthitaṃ vastu sāmānyarūpeṇa sūcayaṃs tattvādhigamānukūlo bhavatīti sūcitam*).

16. For a brief introduction to Dh

17. For bibliographic references to his texts, and corresponding secondary scholarship, see Steinkellner and Much 1995. For discussions of his thought see Dreyfus 1997 and Dunne 2004, and the numerous references contained therein.

18. PVin 1 (introductory passage before PV 1.1) (as quoted in Krasser 2004:142 n. 36): "I have undertaken this work in order to explain what valid awareness is to those who do not know, since acquiring what is beneficial and avoiding what is harmful is invariably due to it" (*hitāhitaprāptiparihārayor niyamena samyagjñānapūrvakatvād aviduṣāṃ tadvyutpādanārtham idam ārabhyate*). See also Vetter 1966:30 n. 1.

19. PVin 1.59: "'How can he say that an awareness-event with a distorted mental impression is not valid and one that is other than that is valid? Since he denies that any awareness-event has an object, there isn't a difference between them.' Seeing that for the unenlightened too there is a lack of confidence in ordinary activity, since there is the problem that distorted mental impressions are not connected, he says that one of them is not valid. The other is said to be valid awareness. This is because, in virtue of its mental impressions standing firm, its connection is unbroken as long as *saṃsāra* endures. Relative to its not disappointing us in our ordinary activities it is valid awareness for us here. And this is what he says is the form of a conventionally valid source of knowledge. About this too, those others—who are fools—lead the world astray. But those who continuously seek out wisdom produced through reflection come face to face with the ultimately valid source of knowledge, which is clear, since it is error free, and does not change" (*so 'pi kathaṃ sarvajñānānāṃ viṣayaṃ vyatirecayann upaplavetarayoḥ pramāṇetaratāṃ brūyāt. upaplavavāsanāvisandhidoṣād aprabuddhasyāpy anāśvāsikaṃ vyavahāram utpaśyann ekam apramāṇam ācakṣīta, aparam ā saṃsāram aviśliṣṭānubandhaṃ dṛḍhavāsanatvād iha vyavahārāvisaṃvādāpekṣayā pramāṇam. sāmvyavahārikasya caitat pramāṇasya rūpam uktam, atrāpi pare mūḍhā visaṃvādayanti lokam iti. cintāmayīm eva tu prajñām anuśīlayanto vibhramavivekanirmalam anapāyi pāramārthikapramāṇam abhimukh-*

In this passage Dharmakīrti clarifies some of what he says in his introductory verse and picks up on many of the themes discussed by Dignāga. He first explains, for example, what he means by "valid" and "invalid" awareness. In explaining how the two are to be distinguished from one another, he also provides an account of what it means to say that valid awareness is "helpful." More specifically, Dharmakīrti argues that those who have a correct account of valid awareness say that acting on the basis of an awareness-event that has a distorted image is not reliable—in the sense that acting on the basis of it will not reliably lead to results that are consistent with the kinds of expectations that we form on the basis of it. As a result, he says, there is a genuine basis for such philosophers to say that such an awareness-event is "not valid." Similarly, according to Dharmakīrti, they also say that acting on the basis of an awareness-event that has a firmly established image is reliable—and will be so as long as the world goes around. As a result of this, he says that there also is a basis for such philosophers to say that such an awareness-event is "valid." Valid awareness is "helpful" in the sense that it is reliable and does not disappoint us or lead us astray.[20] According to Dharmakīrti, this is an essential part of a correct account of conventionally valid awareness.

Dharmakīrti goes on to say that those who are confused about this end up leading the world astray, in the sense that they prevent others from accurately understanding what conventionally valid awareness is, and so distance them from ultimately valid awareness—that is, awareness of *dharma* itself.[21] In contrast, those who focus their attention and meditate upon what is conventionally valid have the chance to realize what is ultimately valid. Although Dharmakīrti is not explicit about this, it is clear that he shares the dual objectives outlined by Dignāga, namely, of arguing against one's opponents—that is, those who lead the world astray—and in support of one's own position. It is also implicit in Dharmakīrti's remarks that his reason for doing so is to put people on the right path for realizing *dharma* by

which according to Vetter 1966:74 n. 3–4 correspond to PV 282, 285. The passage is quoted from Krasser 2004:143, following Steinkellner's forthcoming edition of PVin 1 and 2; it has also been noted by Mikogami (1993:99 n. 34 and translated on p. 93) and Dunne (2004:315–317, 315 n. 35).

20. For a discussion of "validity" in the work of Dharmakīrti, see Katsura 1984, van Biljert 1989, and Dunne 2004. For an excellent discussion of some of the issues raised by Dharmakīrti's account see Krasser 1995. See also McCrea and Patil 2006.

21. See notes 18 and 19.

bringing them closer to it—even though *dharma* itself is inaccessible to conventionally valid awareness and our ordinary sources of knowledge.

In concluding this passage, Dharmakīrti refers to his commentary on an earlier passage, in which he also discusses the relationship between epistemology, conventionally valid awareness, and the path to ultimately valid awareness.[22] In this earlier passage he says that even for Yogis—and so, by implication, for everyone else too—it is only after understanding what has been taught through "awareness based upon what has been heard" and then establishing that what has been heard is fact the case through "awareness based upon reflection"—that is, conventionally valid awareness—that one can put oneself in a position to cultivate the kind of clear, nonconceptual, and ultimately valid awareness that results from meditation and gives one awareness of *dharma* itself. Again, although it is not explicit, the reason those who are mistaken about the nature of valid awareness lead the world astray is that they mislead us all on the basis of their mistaken epistemology, and thus prevent us from arriving at what is conventionally valid. Since an understanding of what is conventionally valid is a prerequisite for ultimately valid awareness—that is, knowledge of the *dharma* itself—a mistaken epistemology necessarily distances us from it.

Ideas very similar to these are also explicitly stated by the Buddhist philosopher Dharmottara (ca. 740–800) in his commentary on this section of Dharmakīrti's text.[23] According to Dharmottara, Dharmakīrti analyzes

22. PVin 1.28 (in Krasser 2004:144 n. 42, following Steinkellner's forthcoming edition of PVin 1 and 2): "By the power of mental cultivation/meditation, it manifests clearly, like fear, etc. That awareness-event which does not disappoint [us] is perception free from conceptualization. Even for Yogis, mental cultivation should follow from understanding things through the awareness of what is heard, followed by their adoption through awareness produced by reflection—that is, reasoning. When complete, there is clear manifesting awareness, as in the case of fear. It is nonconceptual and does not deviate from its object. It is the source of knowledge, perception. It is like the perception of the noble truths as analyzed in my *Pramāṇavārttika*" (*bhāvanābalataḥ spaṣṭaṃ bhayādāv iva bhāsate | yaj jñānam avisaṃvādi tat pratyakṣam akalpakam. yoginām api śrutamayena jñānenārthān gṛhītvā yuktacintāmayena vyavasthāpya bhāvayatāṃ tannispattau yat spaṣṭāvabhāsi bhayādāv iva, tad avikalpakam avitathaviṣayaṃ pramāṇam pratyakṣam, āryasatyadarśanavad yathā nirṇītam asmābhiḥ pramāṇavārttike*). See also Vetter 1966: n. 74, referring to a parallel passage at PVABh 327.16–327.18, and Vetter 1966:73–15, 73 n. 1–3. See also PV 3.285, quoted in Funayama 2005:7 n. 26, where he compares it with Kamalaśīla's *Bhāvanākrama* II.

23. PVinṬ *ad* PVin 1.59=D167b6–181a1=Peking no. 196a2–5: "Even ultimately valid awareness is not without a cause—and there is no cause other than mental cultivation/meditation.

conventionally valid sources of knowledge in great detail, since it is only by meditating on an object that has been established through a conventionally valid source of knowledge that one can realize ultimate truth. Meditating on what is incorrect, and not so established, will not be effective. Thus, for Dharmottara, setting out on the Buddhist path requires both excluding error and establishing what is the case.

While in his *Ascertainment of the Sources of Knowledge* Dharmakīrti is self-conscious about the importance of epistemology (i.e., both perception and inference) and its relation to *dharma*, the commentarial tradition on Dharmakīrti's *Commentary* provides some insight into why specifically inferential reasoning is thought to be of value. The context for this discussion is the order of the chapters in Dharmakīrti's text, which is itself supposed to be a "commentary" on Dignāga's *Compendium*.[24] One group of commentators takes the chapter titled "Inferential Reasoning for Oneself" (*svārthānumāna*)—the only chapter of the text on which Dharmakīrti himself comments—to come first.[25] Another group of commentators takes the chapter "Establishing the Sources of Knowledge" (*pramāṇasiddhi*) to be first, in part because

Moreover, mental cultivation/meditation takes as its object what has been ascertained by conventionally valid awareness. And so the conventionally valid sources of knowledge have been analyzed completely. They become the cause of ultimately valid awareness. . . . For those things that have been made into objects through invalid awareness—imagined as mental images of eternal things, etc.—are not a prerequisite for ultimately valid awareness. But things imagined as momentary mental images are a prerequisite. Therefore, a person who has excluded error will set out on the way to ultimate truth, since this error takes as its object a gross form. Reaching ultimate truth is preceded by ending this error" (*pāramārthikam api pramāṇaṃ na nirhetukam. na ca bhāvanāvyatirikto hetuḥ. bhāvanā ca sāṃvyavahārikapramāṇaparicchinnārthaviṣayā. tataś ca tat saṃvyavahārikaṃ pramāṇaṃ samyaṇ nirūpitaṃ pāramārthikajñānahetuḥ sampadyate. {tatas tadviṣayo yatnaḥ paramārthaviṣaya eva.} mithyājñānena hi viṣayīkṛtā bhāvā nityādibhir ākārair bhāvyamānā na pāramārthikajñānanibandhanaṃ bhavanti. anityādibhis tv ākārair bhāvyamānā nibandhanaṃ bhavanty eva. tasmād ato vyāmohaṃ vyāvartya paramārthanaye 'vatārayitavyo janaḥ, sthūlaviṣayatvād asya vyāmohasya. etadvyāmohanivṛttipūrvikā ca paramārthaprāptiḥ*). The quoted text follows Krasser 2004:144–145 n. 44, who notes that this passage is quoted in the *Dravyālaṃkāraṭīkā*. See Jambuvijayaji 2001:77.19–77.25 and Lindtner 1984:157 n. 23. For PVin 1.59 see earlier notes. Also see D167b2–3=Peking no. 195b4–5, and Krasser's paraphrase in Krasser 2004:144.

24. For a discussion of this issue see Ono 1997 and Kellner 2004b.

25. This group includes Devendrabuddhi (ca. 630–690), Śākyabuddhi (ca. 660–720), Karṇakagomin (fl. 800), and, for different reasons, Ravigupta (fl. ninth century) and Yamāri (fl. eleventh century).

it is organized in terms of Dignāga's description of the qualities of the Buddha in the introductory verse of his *Compendium* and can be seen, therefore, as an extended commentary on the first half of it.[26] Both groups of commentators seem to understand questions about the sequence of chapters as being about the relative importance of providing an account of inferential reasoning at the beginning of a text like Dharmakīrti's *Commentary*, in comparison with providing an account of the qualities of the Buddha.[27] It is worth noting, however, that there is no disagreement about whether these chapters are important or even about the ways in which they are important. What is at issue seems to be their relative importance. In what follows I will focus on the first group of commentators and, more specifically, the remarks of Śākyabuddhi (ca. 660–720) and Karṇakagomin (fl. 800).

In the opening section of his auto-commentary on the "Inference" chapter of his *Commentary*, Dharmakīrti himself explains that inferential reasoning is the basis for distinguishing between what is useful (*artha*) and what is useless (*anartha*). As a result of this, and since there are also many conflicting opinions about it, he says that a correct account of inferential reasoning is important.[28] Śākyabuddhi, in commenting on this line—as a part of his explanation of an earlier commentator's remarks on the order of Dharmakīrti's chapters—explains that what Dharmakīrti means by "useful" is Dignāga's account of the sources of knowledge, and that what he means by "useless" is the account provided by non-Buddhists.[29] As Śākyabuddhi says, the reason

26. This group includes Prajñākaragupta (fl. 800), indirectly, and Jayanta (fl. eleventh century).

27. For a discussion of the structure of the *pramāṇasiddhi* chapter (PV1), see Nagatomi 1959, and Inami and Tillemans 1986.

28. PVSV 1.08–1.09: "He says, 'in order to establish it [i.e., inference] because there is disagreement about it,' since inference is the basis for distinguishing between what is helpful and what is harmful" (*arthānarthavivecanasyānumānāśrayatvāt tadvipratipattes tadvyavasthāpanāyāha*).

29. PVṬ D5b7ff/Q5b3ff, which is parallel to PVSVṬ 6.2–6.5 (as quoted in Kellner 2004b:153 n. 14): "'Helpful' refers to the descriptions of the sources of knowledge, etc., that were set down by the teacher Dignāga, because they are correct. 'Unhelpful' refers to those set down by non-Buddhists, because they are incorrect. Distinguishing which is which is established through their correctness and incorrectness, [and] inference is the basis of that. For it is on the basis of inference alone, and not perception, that the correctness or incorrectness of those descriptive statements can be established. This is because [perception] is nondiscerning" (*ācāryadignāgapraṇītaṃ pramāṇalakṣaṇādikam artho yuktatvāt, tīrthikapraṇītaṃ na yuktatvād anarthaḥ. tayor vivecanaṃ yuktāyuktatvena vyavasthāpanam, tasyānumānāśrayatvāt. anumānam*

Dignāga's account is said to be of value, and the opponents' is not, is that only what Dignāga says is correct (*yukta*). He goes on to say that since for Dharmakīrti perception cannot be used to demonstrate this, it is only on the basis of inferential reasoning that we can distinguish between what is actually correct and what is incorrect. As a result, a correct account of inferential reasoning is a prerequisite for any kind of philosophical analysis, and so Dharmakīrti chooses to discuss it as an independent topic at the beginning of his text, even though Dignāga himself did not.

In a closely related passage, Śākyabuddhi adds to this earlier explanation by saying that a correct account of inferential reasoning is, more specifically, a prerequisite for Dharmakīrti's discussion of the Buddha's teachings, since it is only on the basis of inferential reasoning that we can arrive at a correct understanding of fundamental aspects of what the Buddha taught—e.g., the five aggregates (*skandha*) that constitute living beings, the sensory spheres (*āyatana*), and the eighteen elements (*dhātu*).[30] Śākyabuddhi says that since, in the chapter in which the qualities of the Buddha are discussed, Dharmakīrti wants to show that only the teachings of the Buddha are correct, he needs to first provide an account of inference, on the basis of which he will then be able to show that the Buddha's teachings are correct and the teachings of non-Buddhists are not. As Śākyabuddhi sees it, the dual purpose that Dignāga outlined in the beginning of his *Compendium* is also shared by Dharmakīrti, and presumably by Śākyabuddhi himself.[31] It is also clear from

eva hy āśritya lakṣaṇavākyānāṃ yuktāyuktatvaṃ vyavasthāpyam, na pratyakṣam, tasyāvicārakatvād iti).

30. PVṬ D71b1/Q86a6, parallel to PVKP 517.29–518.02 (as quoted in Kellner 2004b:155 n. 18): "The five aggregates, sensory spheres, and eighteen elements are defined in the three baskets—the teaching of the Buddha, which is [what Devendrabuddhi] meant by 'a text of definitions.' Moreover, that is a source of knowledge, since it does not disappoint. And so 'text of definitions' means a 'text of definitions of the sources of knowledge,' i.e., the words of the Buddha. . . . This is what that means" (*lakṣyante skandhadhātvāyatanāni yena śāstreṇa tal lakṣaṇaśāstraṃ tripiṭakam. pramāṇaṃ ca tad, avisaṃvāditvāt, lakṣaṇaśāstraṃ ceti pramāṇalakṣaṇaśāstraṃ bhagavatpravacanam . . . iti bhāvaḥ*). For a more detailed and contextually grounded analysis of this passage see Kellner 2004b:152–156.

31. VṬ D71a5/Q86a1, parallel to PVKP 517.05–517.06 (as quoted in Kellner 2004b:155 n. 17): "Inference is a prerequisite for that elucidating commentary in which [Dharmakīrti] explains [the meaning of Dignāga's *Compendium*] in the proper manner, after setting aside the false explanations of previous commentators and the false views of non-Buddhists" (*pūrvaṭīkākārāsadvyākhyāṃ tīrthikavimatiṃ cāpanīya yathāsthitavyākhyānaṃ vyākhyā. tasyā nibandhanam anumānam*).

Śākyabuddhi's analysis that being right about the sources of knowledge, and specifically inferential reasoning, is important for having access to the path.

Interestingly, while commenting on this line, Karṇakagomin rejects Śākyabuddhi's claim that for Dharmakīrti, inferential reasoning is of special importance because it is only through inferential reasoning that we can determine what is useful and what is useless. Although Karṇakagomin doesn't disagree that inferential reasoning is *a* basis for making such determinations, he thinks that in certain cases perception is too. For Karṇakagomin, what is uniquely important about inferential reasoning is that it is only through inferential reasoning that we can come to know, conventionally, the four noble truths, and thus hope to make progress on the path. Like his predecessors, he believes that the four noble truths, which constitute *dharma*, cannot be known through perception. For Karṇakagomin, when Dharmakīrti says "useful" what he means is the cessation of suffering and the path that leads to it—that is, the third and fourth noble truths—while when he says "useless" what he means is suffering and its causes—the first and second noble truths. Like Dharmottara, Karṇakagomin also explains that it is only after someone has come to know the four noble truths inferentially, and has meditated upon them, that ultimately valid awareness is possible.[32]

Dharmakīrti and many of the commentators on his *Ascertainment of the Sources of Knowledge* and *Commentary on the Compendium of the Sources of Knowledge* pick up on, and in some cases extend, Dignāga's treatment of the four

32. PVSVṬ 7.23–7.28 *ad* PVSV 1.8 (as quoted in Kellner 2004b:157 n. 20): "And the Buddha has said that 'liberation arises by seeing the four noble truths.' Moreover, 'seeing' them is the result of repeated meditation, and [one] engages in meditation by ascertaining the four noble truths. And since [they] are supersensory, their ascertainment is possible only on the basis of inference. Thus [Dharmakīrti says] that inference is the only basis for distinguishing between what is helpful and what is harmful. 'Helpful' means the path toward cessation, because that is to be sought out. 'Harmful' means suffering and its causes, because they are to be abandoned. Alternatively, 'helpful' is ultimate truth [and] 'unhelpful' is conventional truth" (*muktiś {ca} caturāryasatyadarśanād bhavatīti bhagavatoktam. taddarśanaṃ ca bhāvanābhyāsato niṣpadyate. bhāvanāyāṃ pravṛttiś ca caturāryasatyaniścayena. tanniścayaś ca parokṣatvād anumānād eva bhavatīty arthānarthavivecanāśrayatvam anumānasyaiva. artho nirodhamārgāv upādeyatvād, anartho duḥkhasamudayau, tyājyatvāt. yad vā 'rthaḥ paramārthasatyam anarthaḥ saṃvṛttisatyaṃ*). Kellner reads Śākyabuddhi as understanding the role of inference to be "outward" whereas she reads Karṇakagomin as taking its significance to be "inward"; see Kellner's excellent summary at Kellner 2004b:157.

issues that structure his account of the purpose and value of Buddhist epistemology in his *Compendium*. There is, for example, widespread agreement that there is a dual purpose in the work of the Buddhist epistemologists—namely, to argue both against their opponents' account of the sources of knowledge and in support of their own. There is also widespread agreement that a correct account of the sources of knowledge brings one closer to understanding and realizing the *dharma*, even though *dharma* itself is inaccessible to philosophical analysis. One of the reasons given for this is that the realization of *dharma* requires meditating upon an object—specifically, the teaching of the Buddha—that has been established on the basis of conventionally valid sources of knowledge—most relevantly, inference. Establishing an object in this way seems to fix it in awareness in the way that is required for successful meditation. What is important is not just that one is aware of an object that can, for example, withstand critical philosophical analysis, but that this object is fixed in awareness as a result of a conventionally valid awareness-event. There is little doubt that the Buddhist epistemological tradition, as inherited by Ratnakīrti, views philosophy, and epistemology more specifically, as having value, in that it can turn one away from incorrect views and toward the kind of view that can lead one to the realization of *dharma* itself.

2. The Soteriological Significance of Epistemology

Unlike his predecessors, Ratnakīrti is rarely explicit about his commitment to the ideals of his text tradition regarding the soteriological significance of epistemology. As I will argue, however, he is clearly committed to these ideals and views his own work in support of them. As a way of illustrating this, I will focus on aspects of Ratnakīrti's discussion of the inference for omniscience, as presented in his "Demonstration of Omniscience" (*Sarvajñasiddhi*), in which he tries to prove that meditating (*bhāvanā*) upon a conceptually constructed mental object—in particular, the four noble truths—can lead to omniscience, the ultimately valid awareness of *dharma* itself.[33] I will argue

33. This text is edited and translated in Bühneman 1980 and Goodman 1989. For an excellent discussion of omniscience in Buddhist philosophy see McClintock 2002.

Here is Ratnakīrti's inference as presented at RNĀ (SS 1.20–1.24): "Every mental element that is accompanied by repeated reflection that is sincere, uninterrupted, and continues for a long period of time [the reason property] is capable of becoming manifest [target property], like the mental image of a young woman for her lover [a similar case]. And these mental images, whose objects are the four noble truths [the site of the inference], are mental elements that are accompanied by repeated reflection, as stated above" (*yo yaḥ sādaranirantaradīrghakālābhyāsasahitacetoguṇaḥ sa sarvaḥ sphuṭībhāvo yogyaḥ | yathā yuvatyākāraḥ kāminaḥ puruṣasya | yathoktābhyāsasahitacetoguṇāś cāmī caturāryasatyaviṣayā ākārā iti {svabhāvo hetuḥ}*). Ratnakīrti describes the components of the inference at RNĀ (SS 4.31–4.32): "So here the site of the inference is the complete complex of the mental image of the four noble truths together with meditation upon them. The reason property is the complete complex of a mental element in general which is characterized by meditation. The target property is the capacity to be manifest" (*tad atrābhyāsasahitacaturāryasatyākāraḥ samagro dharmī sāmagryam abhyāsaviśiṣṭacetoguṇatvamātraṃ hetuḥ sphuṭībhāvayogyatāsādhyam*).

34. That there is a dual purpose to his "Demonstration of Omniscience" (SS) is evident from RNĀ (SS 1.11–1.14), where Ratnakīrti explains Dharmakīrti's "intentions"—and in this way his own—in arguing against his opponents' views and in support of his own. In this case, Ratnakīrti identifies the "opponent" as the Mīmāṃsaka, Kumārila; see RNĀ (SS 1.7). Also see RNĀ (SS 1.11–1.15), where—while discussing the views of Dharmakīrti—Ratnakīrti indicates that the Buddha is one who "knows the truth of what is to be given up, what is to be sought out, and the means of accomplishing both" (*saparikaraheyopādeyatattvajña*)—that is, the four noble truths. Ratnakīrti makes this identification at RNĀ (SS 2.07–2.09), where he says that the "mental image of the four noble truths is defined by what is to be given up, what is to be sought out, and the means of accomplishing both" (*saparikaraheyopādeyātmakasya caturāryasatyākārasya*). For a further discussion of this see Bühneman 1980:92 n. 7. For some other references see PVABh 52.16–52.20, PVV 20.22ff. For more on this type of inference, see Steinkellner 1999 and Eltschinger 2007b. For more on Ratnakīrti's inference see Moriyama 2004 and Taber (forthcoming).

further that his discussion of this inference provides a new perspective on his other work, by revealing his otherwise implicit commitment to the ideals of his text tradition and his own understanding of their significance.

2.1. Dual Purpose

In setting up his inference for proving the omniscience of the Buddha, Ratnakīrti indirectly indicates the dual purpose of his work. Following Dharmakīrti, he says that he will prove the omniscience of the Buddha in order (1) to argue against his opponents, who reject the possibility of anyone being able to have direct knowledge of *dharma*, and (2) to establish that it is possible for someone to know *dharma* itself—that is, to have direct, noninferential awareness of what is to be given up, what is to be sought out, and the means of accomplishing both.[34] Unlike Dignāga, however, Ratnakīrti does

not directly say that he will be arguing against his opponents' views on the sources of knowledge and in support of his own. Nevertheless, since it is on the basis of his opponents' understanding of these sources that Ratnakīrti argues against their conclusions, and on the basis of his own understanding of these sources that he argues in support of his conclusions, it is clear that there is a direct relationship between the dual purpose of his text, as stated here, and the sources of knowledge.[35]

2.2. *Proximity to the* Dharma

Unlike many of his predecessors, Ratnakīrti does not directly say that a proper account of conventionally valid awareness and the sources of knowledge that produce it is soteriologically significant since on the basis of it people who are "distant" from the teachings of the Buddha can be brought "closer" to it. This is, however, something that is implied by his work. For Ratnakīrti, the relevant teachings of the Buddha are the "four noble truths" (*caturāryasatya*), which he suggests are themselves related to the underlying truth of selflessness (*nairātmya*)—the view that there is no enduring self.[36] As Ratnakīrti sees it, discontent (*duḥkha*)—the first noble truth—is defined in terms of the five psycho-physical aggregates (*skandha*) that are thought to be constitutive of living beings.[37] The cause of this discontent (*samudaya*)—the second noble truth—is, as Ratnakīrti says, the false belief that these five psycho-physical aggregates constitute an enduring self (*ātmadṛṣṭi*).[38] That

35. For more on this point see section 2.4.

36. For the idea that the four noble truths are what is relevant see RNĀ (SS 20.07–20.08). For a defense of the claim that the four noble truths are related to the view that there is no enduring self and momentariness, see below.

37. See RNĀ (SS 2.17), where Ratnakīrti says that discontent (*duḥkha*) "is just the five current psycho-physical aggregates" (*vārtamānikapañcaskandhātmaka*). A similar formulation is repeated at RNĀ (SS 2.22), where it is said that the "effect" (*kārya*)—that is, discontent—is "defined by the five psycho-physical aggregates that migrate through existence" (*sāṃsārikapañcaskandhalakṣaṇa*). That discontent (*duḥkha*) is to be identified as "what is to be given up" is suggested at RNĀ (SS 2.07–2.10, 2.11).

38. See RNĀ (SS 2.20), where, in responding to the objection at RNĀ (SS 2.4) that the cause (*hetu*) of "what is to be given up" (*heya*) is not known, Ratnakīrti says that it has been ascertained that "with respect to discontent, the cause is identified as the view that there is an enduring self, along with actions whose efficacy in worldly life is due to error and desire" (*duḥkhe viparyāsatṛṣṇāpravṛttiśaktikarmabhiḥ sahitasyātmadṛṣṭilakṣaṇasya hetoḥ*). This idea is also repeated at RNĀ (SS 2.27) in a verse that Steinkellner (1977) suggests is from Jñānaśrīmitra's now lost "Demonstration of Omniscience" (*Sarvajñasiddhi*).

the cessation of this discontent (*nirodha*) is possible—the third noble truth—is directly explained in terms of selflessness, which Ratnakīrti says is an antidote to the false belief in an enduring self.[39] The path to the cessation of discontent (*mārga*)—the fourth noble truth—is said to be nothing other than the conventionally valid awareness of selflessness, which is itself established by proving that all existing things are momentary.[40]

In arguing that meditation on the four noble truths can lead to the direct manifestation of *dharma* itself, Ratnakīrti is in effect saying that meditation on selflessness can lead to its direct manifestation, which he says is just what omniscience is.[41] Ratnakīrti further identifies selflessness and the thesis that all existing things are momentary as the unique teachings of the Buddha, and thus suggests that they alone are the proper objects for meditation.[42] In his "Demonstration of Omniscience" Ratnakīrti switches back and forth between referring to the objects of meditation as "the four noble truths," "selflessness," and "momentariness." Since, as I have argued, the four noble truths can be reduced to selflessness, and selflessness is itself established

39. See RNĀ (SS 2.31), where Ratnakīrti explains that discontent can come to an end "because it is possible to see that selflessness is an antidote to the ignorance that takes the form of the view that there is an enduring self" (*ātmadṛṣṭirūpāyā avidyāyāḥ pratipakṣabhūtasya nairātmyadarśanasya saṃbhavāt*). Also see RNĀ (SS 2.29), where Ratnakīrti says that "it is by arguing against the idea of a self that the error in the view that there is a self is seen" (*ātmadarśanasya cāvidyātvam ātmapratikṣepato draṣṭavyam*).

40. See RNĀ (SS 3.01), where Ratnakīrti responds to the objection, at RNĀ (SS 2.04), that there is no known defeater (*bādhaka*) of the view that there is a self, by saying that this is not the case "since it is validly ascertained that the selflessness thesis is denoted by the term 'path'" (*nairātmyadarśanasya mārgaśabdavācyasya pramāṇato niścitatvāt*). See also Trilocana's account of the Buddhist position at RNĀ (SS 14.16–14.22)—especially where the "path" is said to be defined by momentariness as the object of contemplation. Also see JNĀ (KKBhS 323.03–323.05), which is translated in Kajiyama 1998:54 n. 128.

41. See RNĀ (SS 21.20), where Ratnakīrti says that "meditation on the truth of the path is how omniscience is established" (*mārgasatyābhyāsāt siddhaḥ sarvajñaḥ*).

42. See RNĀ (SS 6.11–6.12), where he says that for those who want to know not about an omniscient person in general, but about a particular omniscient person, "the Lord Buddha, who is omniscient, [is] the only one who taught momentariness and selflessness in accordance with the sources of knowledge" (*pramāṇopapannakṣaṇikanairātmyavādina eva sugatasya bhagavataḥ sarvajñatā*). That the teachings of the Buddha are the only proper objects of meditation follows from RNĀ (SS 19.17–19.21) and (SS 21.14–21.20), which are quoted and translated below.

through (and often identified with) momentariness, I will refer to the object of meditation as "selflessness/momentariness."[43]

In an interesting passage in his "Demonstration," Ratnakīrti discusses the relationship between the conventionally valid awareness of selflessness/momentariness and the teachings of the Buddha, and suggests why he thinks that being right about epistemology is of value. In this passage Ratnakīrti suggests that to be distant from the teachings of the Buddha is to be distracted (*vikṣepa*), by being turned away from the truth of selflessness/momentariness.[44] Since what distracts or confuses people is their false belief in an enduring self, successfully arguing against this view is, he suggests, conducive to turning people toward the truth of selflessness/momentariness. More specifically, it removes an impediment to successfully following the path.[45] Elsewhere Ratnakīrti also suggests that it is necessary to show that one's view, which in this context is the view that all existing things are momentary, is properly established. Ratnakīrti provides two reasons for this: First, he suggests that since the awareness that all things are momentary is itself an antidote to the false view that there is an enduring self, arguing in support of it helps to turn people away from their false views. Second, and more important for Ratnakīrti, the proper object of meditation must be an object of conventionally valid awareness—that is, an object that has been established on the basis of a source of knowledge. Furthermore, it seems as though it must also be known to be so.[46] A

43. This pairing is very common, both in Ratnakīrti's text and in the tradition that he inherits. See, for example, McClintock 2002.

44. In this passage, RNĀ (SS 21.14–21.20), Ratnakīrti is responding to an earlier objection by Vācaspatimiśra—RNĀ (SS 15.20–15.27)—in which he argues that since, according to Buddhist philosophers like Ratnakīrti, awareness-events can have only a single object/image, our thoughts can never be really distracted. As a result, he says, there should be no need to practice meditation in order to eliminate "distractions" and focus our minds on a single object. In his response to this objection Ratnakīrti explains that this is not the case since "any [awareness] at all that is turned away from the truths of selflessness, etc., is distracted [and any awareness] that is directly presented with those truths, through meditation, is focused" (*nairātmyāditattvaparāṅmukhasya sarvasyaiva vikṣiptatvāt | bhāvanābalena tattvasākṣātkāriṇaḥ samāhitatvāt*).

45. This idea is expressed a few lines later in the same passage—RNĀ (SS 21.16–21.18)—where Ratnakīrtti says that even in everyday life the apparent difference between a grasping subject and grasped objects is how the "productive practice of the path is obstructed" (*mārgābhyāsapravṛttir abhyāhateti*).

46. These two reasons are suggested by RNĀ (SS 19.17–19.21), which is also a part of Ratnakīrti's response to Vācaspatimiśra's objections, and more specifically, to the objection—

proper account of such awareness is therefore necessary and of soteriological significance.

It is interesting that Ratnakīrti doesn't say why the proper object of meditation must be an object of conventionally valid awareness or explain in what sense his opponents' belief in an enduring self is "false." While he does not address this issue directly, it is possible to reconstruct Ratnakīrti's views by drawing upon the resources of his text tradition and the nature of his other work. As I have argued in chapters 2 and 3, there are two senses in which Ratnakīrti thinks that his opponents' views on the existence of Īśvara are "false." What they say about Īśvara is "false," on the one hand, because by their own lights they have not certified the Īśvara-inference and cannot do so. As an object of awareness, the existence of Īśvara cannot withstand philosophical analysis and in fact crumbles in the face of it. Moreover, as discussed in chapter 5, for Ratnakīrti, awareness-events that are not valid are not pragmatically effective and thus "mislead" us with respect to their content. In a slightly different sense, the Naiyāyikas' view is also "false" in that it is incompatible with the claim that all existing things are momentary, a conclusion that Ratnakīrti thinks he has established inferentially. He thinks that the momentariness thesis, unlike the existence of Īśvara, can withstand philosophical analysis, and remains firm in the face of it. Insofar as momentariness is known to be the object of a conventionally valid awareness-event, there is also certainty about it that adds to its stability.

In part, then, what seems to make an object of conventionally valid awareness a proper object of meditation is that, unlike objects that are not

which is not necessarily Vācaspatimiśra's—at RNĀ (SS 19.15–19.17), where the issue of the proper object of meditation is raised. In his response, Ratnakīrti explains that he does not say that "the sense-faculty of the mind, along with meditation on an object that has been fixed by a source of knowledge, leads to an awareness-event in which the nature of the object itself is grasped—but rather that it is meditation on the real nature of all things, which is defined by momentariness and selflessness, that opposes the ignorance constituted by false views" (*{na hi vayaṃ} pramāṇadṛṣṭavastubhāvanāsahitaṃ mana indriyam arthasvarūpagrāhijñānaṃ janayatīti brūmaḥ, api tv asaddṛṣṭilakṣaṇāvidyāparipanthikṣaṇikanairātmyalakṣaṇasarvavastutattvabhāvanāsahitam*). He goes on to say that the "real nature of all things" (*sarvavastutattvam*) is "just momentariness and selflessness, which has been made known by establishing momentary destruction" (*kṣaṇikanairātmyam eveti kṣaṇabhaṅgaprasādhanataḥ pratipāditam iti*). The same point is also made, in almost the exact same language, a few pages later at RNĀ (SS 20.18–21.21).

conventionally valid and/or known to be so, it is epistemically stable. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, only conventionally valid awareness-events are pragmatically effective and capable of effectively leading us to their objects. It is important to note that for Ratnakīrti, it is only by meditating on selflessness/momentariness that the clear manifestation of *dharma* itself is possible.[47] This is because, for Ratnakīrti, selflessness/momentariness is the nature of reality, and by meditating on it, it is possible for reality itself to be manifest in awareness, just as a lovesick man's meditating on the form of his lover can result in her becoming manifest to him.[48]

2.3. "Dharma" *and the* Dharma *Itself*

Ratnakīrti is very clear that the proper objects of meditation are mental objects—and more specifically, mental objects whose representational content is the four noble truths or, as I have argued, selflessness/momentariness. As Ratnakīrti emphasizes, it is necessary that what is meditated upon be proven by a conventionally valid source of knowledge, in this case inferential reasoning. Although what is proven through inferential reasoning is an O4 object, what is meditated upon is an object that one can focus one's attention upon, like the form of a woman for her lover. Unlike the form of the woman, which is based on sense perception, the object of meditation is not (and cannot be) based on sense perception. As Ratnakīrti explains, momentariness—and therefore the four noble truths—is not an object of sense perception. In this sense it is like any other inferred object, such as the "fire" that is inferred in the standard inference of fire from smoke.

One way to think of the object that is meditated upon may be in terms of an inferred O4 object as it is subsequently brought to mind (perhaps through memory). As such, this object will be—like the form of the woman or the concept "fire"—an O2 object that one can mentally act upon. Like the concept of the inferred object "fire," which is capable of leading us to a "real" fire on

47. See prior note, where RNĀ (SS 19.15–19.17) is discussed. It is important to note that Ratnakīrti also says, at RNĀ (SS 20.07, 4.24–4.28), that as the objects of valid awareness-events, the four noble truths and selflessness are proper objects for meditation. As I have argued, however, they are all, in the relevant sense, equivalent to momentariness.

48. Again see note 46, where RNĀ (SS 19.15–19.17) is discussed. Ratnakīrti also argues this point in a number of other places.

the mountain that we can perceive through sense perception, the object of meditation is also supposed to be capable of leading us to a clear manifest awareness of momentariness—that is, the *dharma* itself. According to Ratnakīrti, as a result of meditation it is possible for us to directly "see" the *dharma* itself, through a special kind of perception called "yogic perception."[49] Like his predecessors, Ratnakīrti does not think that the *dharma* itself is accessible to our conventional sources of knowledge. What is accessible are only constructed O2/O4 objects such as the "four noble truths," "selflessness," and "momentariness." But, as Ratnakīrti argues in this essay, meditating on these constructed O2 objects can lead to the manifestation of *dharma* itself.[50]

Ratnakīrti's discussion of the omniscience-inference provides an interesting new framework within which to view his work as a whole, and also my analysis of his argument against the existence of Īśvara (chapters 2 and 3) and theory of mental images (chapters 4 and 5). One of the threads running through these four chapters has been the question of Ratnakīrti's purpose, and more specifically what is at stake for him in the various arguments that he makes and the counterarguments to which he responds. It is interesting that Ratnakīrti never mentions that his technical arguments against the existence of Īśvara are relevant to the path taught by the Buddha or discusses in any detail why epistemology itself is of importance. When it is viewed from within the framework of his remarks in his "Demonstration of Omniscience," however, I will argue that much of Ratnakīrti's work can be viewed in relation to his text tradition's shared ideals regarding the soteriological significance of epistemology.

It is clear from the nature of Ratnakīrti's work as a whole that the dual purpose that he alludes to in setting up his "Demonstration of Omniscience" is not restricted to this text. Of the ten extant texts by Ratnakīrti, two are devoted to arguing against his opponents' views, five focus on establishing his own, and the remaining three argue against rival positions while also supporting his own.[51] Some of these texts can be seen, therefore,

49. RNĀ (SS 19.17–19.21), discussed above, and RNĀ (SS 20.05–20.11).

50. In two very interesting passages, Ratnakīrti explains how the omniscience-inference is different from inferences like the inference of fire from smoke; see RNĀ (SS 4.24–4.28) and RNĀ (SS 5.04–5.10). See also Eltschinger 2007b and Steinkellner 1999.

51. RNĀ (ĪSD) and RNĀ (SSD) are devoted to arguing against his opponents. RNĀ (SS), RNĀ (AS), RNĀ (KSA), RNĀ (KSV), and RNĀ (CAPV) focus on establishing his

as extended arguments against the conclusions of his opponents, while others can be seen as attempts at establishing his own positive views. As I have argued in this book, what is at stake in these texts is much more than just the particular position being argued for or against. What is at stake is also the epistemological framework within which such arguments are presented and defended. Thus, in arguing against his opponent's conclusions and in support of his own, he is arguing against their understanding of the sources of knowledge and in support of his own. As I have argued, this is evident from the nature of Ratnakīrti's critique of the Īśvara-inference and the close relationship between this critique and his theory of exclusion and mental images. While much of this was only implicit in Ratnakīrti's criticism of the Īśvara-inference, what Ratnakīrti says in his "Demonstration of Omniscience" supports my argument explicitly. For Ratnakīrti, as for his predecessors, one's philosophical work serves a dual purpose: to argue against one's opponents' conclusions and the epistemology that supports them, and to argue in support of one's own view and the epistemology that supports it.

Attending to Ratnakīrti's "Demonstration of Omniscience" helps us to see that for him too this dual purpose is of soteriological significance. In this context, what is especially important about his critique of the Īśvara-inference is that Īśvara is generally taken to be the paradigmatic example of an enduring self. Exposing inherent problems in the Īśvara-inference is therefore extremely important for turning (some) of his opponents away from their false view of an enduring self. A similar point can also be made about his arguments against the claim that entities endure through time and in support of his momentariness thesis. In the interpretive framework provided by his "Demonstration of Omniscience," Ratnakīrti's extensive discussion of this issue takes on new significance. His arguments in support of momentariness can be seen as an attempt at turning his opponents away from their false views and bringing them closer to the *dharma*, by establishing the "object" that he will show is the proper object of meditation. As I have argued, his support of the theory of exclusion, mental images, and pervasion can also be viewed in terms of its soteriological significance. By establishing his own position on each of these issues, Ratnakīrti develops the philosophical resources that support his critique of his opponents and the epistemology for

own views. RNĀ (PAP), RNĀ (SD), and RNĀ (VN) do both. For the full titles with translations see chapter 1 and the list of abbreviations in the front matter.

his own positive conclusions. When taken together, the theory of exclusion and his account of mental images support a theory of content according to which there is ultimately no "object" of awareness. These texts thus (1) turn his opponents away from all of their false views, by showing them that the epistemology that is used to support them is not adequate; and (2) turn them toward his own views, by showing them that his epistemology overcomes the inherent weaknesses in theirs, without any added cost.

3. Jñānaśrīmitra on Epistemology as Pedagogy

As I have argued in this chapter, the insights provided by Ratnakīrti's text tradition—as defined by the work of Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, and their commentators—make it possible to see clearly what is implicit in Ratnakīrti's work that might otherwise pass unnoticed. Ratnakīrti's greatest intellectual debts, however, are to his teacher Jñānaśrīmitra, whose own work is the direct source of many of his arguments and provides the detailed blueprints for much of his corpus.[52] Ratnakīrti's work is in no small part a deliberate, careful, and strategic reconstruction of many of his teacher's texts and arguments.[53] The very high degree to which Ratnakīrti is faithful to his teacher's work, however, also highlights areas of difference. Just as what is understated in Ratnakīrti's work can sometimes be brought to the surface by viewing it from within its broader intellectual context, so too can what he chooses

52. Comparing the titles of Ratnakīrti's texts with those of his teacher illustrates this nicely. Jñānaśrīmitra's extant works are as follows: "A Study of Moment by Moment Destruction" (*Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāya*), "Analysis of Pervasion" (*Vyāpticarcā*), "Examination of 'Difference and Nondifference'" (*Bhedābhedaparīkṣā*), "The Mystery of Nonapprehension" (*Anupalabdhirahasya*), "Investigation of the Total Absence of Sound" (*Sarvaśabdābhāvaparīkṣā*), "Monograph on Exclusion" (*Apohaprakaraṇa*), "Debating God" (*Īśvaravāda*), "Proof of the Cause-Effect Relationship" (*Kāryakāraṇabhāvasiddhi*), "Monograph on the Discernment of Yogis" (*Yoginirṇayaprakaraṇa*), "Monograph on the Drop of Nonduality" (*Advaitabinduprakaraṇa*), "A Treatise Proving That Awareness Contains an Image" (*Sākārasiddhiśāstra*), and "A Verse Summary on the Possession of an Image" (*Sākārasaṃgrahasūtra*). In addition to these texts, Jñānaśrīmitra also wrote a work on poetic meter (see Hahn 1971 and Hahn 1989) and a lost "Demonstration of Omniscience" (*Sarvajñasiddhi*) (see Steinkellner 1977).

53. For a very clear example of this compare Lasic 2000a with Lasic 2000b. Also see

to suppress. In this section I want to discuss a concept that is central to Jñānaśrīmitra's "Monograph on Exclusion" (*Apohaprakaraṇa*), but that is deliberately written out of Ratnakīrti's own "Demonstration of Exclusion."

The concept of a "conditionally adopted position" (*vyavasthā*) is the basis for Jñānaśrīmitra's account of why his predecessors (and sometimes he himself) argue in support of philosophical positions that are strictly speaking not correct.[54] For Jñānaśrīmitra, attending to the use of "conditionally adopted positions" is also crucial for understanding the pedagogical role that he takes his text tradition to assign to epistemology. I will argue that in writing this concept out of his work, Ratnakīrti, while agreeing with the pedagogical role of epistemology as understood by Jñānaśrīmitra, shifts its focus, and in so doing reveals not only what he takes to be of primary importance about it, but also where his view differs from that of his teacher. As I hope to show, what Jñānaśrīmitra says about conditionally adopted positions helps us to see what is implicit and suppressed both in Ratnakīrti's own work regarding the pedagogical role of epistemology, and in philosophy more generally.

3.1. A Multiple-Content Model of Awareness

The philosophical context for Jñānaśrīmitra's discussion of conditionally adopted positions is the multiple-content model of awareness that Ratnakīrti shares with him.[55] Recall that according to this model, each state of awareness has two objects: a grasped object, which is directly present in awareness, and a determined object, which is conceptually constructed through exclusion. What is so striking about this model is that it seems to fly in the face of what is arguably their text tradition's most basic tenet and characteristic feature: the claim that perception is free from conceptual construction.[56] For many Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophers alike, this tenet was taken to be the foundational insight of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Before turning to how Jñānaśrīmitra accounts for what appears to be his radical departure from Dignāga and Dharmakīrti's account of the content of

54. Much of my discussion in this section is based on Patil 2007. See also McCrea and Patil 2006.

55. For a detailed discussion of Ratnakīrti's version of this model see chapter 5.

56. See chapter 5, section 1, where Dharmottara's NBṬ 70–72 *ad* Dharmakīrti's NB 1.12 is quoted and translated.

perception, it will be helpful to briefly review the multiple-content model of awareness, by focusing on what Jñānaśrīmitra says about it.

Like Ratnakīrti, Jñānaśrīmitra says that each state of valid awareness must have two objects, a grasped object and a determined object.[57] In his "Analysis of Pervasion" (*Vyāpticarcā*), in a debate specifically about the nature of the object of perception, Jñānaśrīmitra states this very clearly. He says,

> Now, for us, both modes of valid awareness have both objects, because of the distinction between what is grasped and what is determined. For that which is manifest in an episode of awareness is what is grasped, but that with respect to which it [i.e., the episode of awareness] functions is what is determined. Now, for perception, what is grasped is a particular and what is determined is a universal. But for inference it is the reverse.[58]

Just as for Ratnakīrti, in both perception and inference both manifestation and determination are necessary. This is because each mode of awareness must have two objects, a grasped object, the object that is manifest in awareness,

57. Although Jñānaśrīmitra adopts the structure of Dharmottara's model of valid awareness and its objects, he criticizes him in a number of places in his work. See, for example, JNĀ (AP 205), on the issue of implicative negation (*paryudāsa*); JNĀ (AP 228), on imposition (*āropa*); JNĀ (KKBhS 322), ou causality (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*); JNĀ (YN 332), on supernormal perception (*yogipratyakṣa*); the references in Woo 2001 to Jñānaśrīmitra's KBhA; and the references in Kellner 1997a to his AR. There are also important differences between Jñānaśrīmitra and Dharmottara's version of the two-object model of perception and inference. For a discussion of some of these differences see McCrea and Patil 2006 and below.

58. JNĀ (VC 166.13–16) and Lasic 2000a:13*.02–13*.06 (note that Lasic [2000a:13*.03] corrects Thakur *–adhyavaseyabhedena* from *adhyavasāyabhedena*): *asmākaṃ tāvad ubhayam api pramāṇam ubhayaviṣayam, grāhyādhyavaseyabhedena. yaddhi yatra jñāne pratibhāsate, tad grāhyam. yatra tu tat pravartate, tad adhyavaseyam. tatra pratyakṣasya svalakṣaṇaṃ grāhyam, adhyavaseyaṃ ca sāmānyam. anumānasya tu viparyayaḥ.* See also JNĀ (AP 225.17): *dvidhā viṣayavyavahāraḥ pratibhāsād adhyavasāyāc ca* ("There are two ways of talking about objects: On the basis of appearance and on the basis of determination"). The idea is also discussed in JNĀ (KBhA 137.15–137.18). It is worth noting that Jñānaśrīmitra, unlike Dharmottara, explicitly identifies the determined object of perception as a universal (*sāmānya*) in order to provide a basis for distinguishing between the two different kinds of uuiversals that can be constructed from the grasped moment in the perceptual process. See also JNĀ (VC 166.14–166.21) and Lasic 2000a:13*.06–14*.14. JNĀ (VC 166.16–19) is also discussed and translated in Balcerowicz 1999:212.

and a determined object, the object that we take ourselves to be acting with respect to.[59] In the case of perception, the grasped object is generally called a "particular" and the determined object a "universal," while in inferential/verbal awareness the grasped object is generally called a "universal" and the determined object a "particular."[60] Thus, to properly account for the contents of perception and inference (and their validity) both manifestation and determination are necessary.[61]

Equally important to Jñānaśrīmitra's basic picture is his insistence that the determined objects of both perception and inference are conceptualized. In other words, like determination, conceptualization (*vikalpa*) is an equally important and essential part of both perception and inference. When confronted with an objector who presses him to explain why Dharmakīrti himself appears to use the terms "conceptualization" and "determination" contrastively in his *Short Study of the Reason Property* (*Hetubindu*),[62] he says,

59. In this passage Jñānaśrīmitra just states his view. He argues in support of his position that both appearance and determination/conceptualization are necessary at JNĀ (AP 230.08–231.02).

60. The qualification "generally called" is necessary when describing Jñānaśrīmitra's view since, according to him, the terms "particular" and "universal" do not really refer to ontologically distinct entities. For him, these two terms are defined relative to the mental process that follows the appearance of what we take to be a particular or a universal. See, for example, JNĀ (AP 220.02–220.09) for a discussion of this. This passage and a related passage about Jñānaśrīmitra's relativization of the terms "internal" and "external" are discussed in McCrea and Patil 2006.

61. JNĀ (AP 230.24–230.27): "Whatever does not appear in a certain episode of awareness or is not determined by it is not the object of that awareness, just as a horse [is not the object] of the awareness 'cow.' And a particular does not appear in verbal awareness, and a mental image is not determined by it. Thus [in each case] a pervading factor is missing. Since a necessary relation has been established [between being both manifest in appearance and determined, and being an object of awareness], [this inferential reason] is not inconclusive" (*yatra jñāne yan na pratibhāsate yena vā yan nāvasīyate sa na tasya viṣayo yathā gojñānasyāśvaḥ | na pratibhāsate ca śābdajñāne svalakṣaṇam, nāvasīyate cānena buddhyākāra iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ | pratibandhasādhanān nānaikāntikaḥ*).

62. The opponent's discomfort with Jñānaśrīmitra's position is clearly stated at JNĀ (AP 225.19–225.26), where the opponent quotes a fragment from Dharmakīrti, HB 3*.14–3*.15, to support his view that these terms are used contrastively. This fragment is quoted again at JNĀ (AP 227.10–227.11), which is quoted below.

> "Conceptualization" and "determination" refer to the same thing. It's just that the [use of the] word "conceptualization" is occasioned by connection with words and the like, while "determination" is occasioned by suitability for activity, even with respect to [an object] that is not grasped [by awareness].[63]

According to Jñānaśrīmitra, determination is really nothing but conceptualization and conceptualization is really nothing but determination. The only meaningful difference between them is that the word "conceptualization" is generally used when we want to say that the object of our awareness is inextricably bound up with the form of the word that is used to refer to it—that is, in inferential and verbal contexts.[64] On the other hand, the word "determination" is generally used when we want to talk about the objects of our awareness as if they were objects that we could act upon—that is, in contexts of intentional activity (which includes activity based on perception and inferential/verbal awareness).[65] For Jñānaśrīmitra, however, the terminological distinction between conceptualization and determination is neither based on, nor reveals, a real difference in the mental processes to which the two terms refer. Rather, it is the result of a fictional difference that is indexed

63. JNĀ (AP 226.01–226.03): *satyam ekārthau vikalpādhyavasāyau kevalaṃ vikalpaśabdaḥ śabdādiyojanānimittakaḥ | adhyavasāyas tv agṛhīte 'pi pravartanayogyatānimittaḥ.*

64. This is, of course, completely consistent with the way(s) in which Dignāga and Dharmakīrti describe conceptualization. As is well known, at PS 1.3d Dignāga explains that conceptualization (*kalpanā*) is "association with a name, class character, etc." (*nāmajātyādiyojanā*). Dharmakīrti expresses a similar idea at PVin 1.4b–c, where he says that "a conceptual state of awareness is a state of awareness associated with words" (*abhilāpinī pratītiḥ kalpanā*), and at NB 1.5 (=PVin 1.40.6–8), where he says that "conceptualization is a state of awareness in which a mental image is associated with words" (*abhilāpasaṃsargayogyapratibhāsā pratītiḥ kalpanā*). For an extremely interesting and thorough discussion of this see Funayama 1992:44–48; 59 n. 38, 39; 75 n. 116; 77 n. 121. See also the excellent discussion in Franco 1984.

65. This is also consistent with what Dharmakīrti has to say. Consider, for example, the famous quotation at PVin 2.8, where he says, "because even though its image is not an object there is activity through the determination of an object" (*svapratibhāse 'narthe 'rthādhyavasāyena pravartanāt*). For a discussion of this concept and term, see Katsura 1984, Katsura 1993, and the references in Dunne 2004. It may be worth noting that in McCrea and Patil 2006 we argue that Dharmakīrti uses the term "determination" only when discussing inferential and verbal states of awareness and that it may not be helpful, therefore, to think of determination as a form of "perceptual judgment." For Jñānaśrīmitra's account of intentional activity as including physical, verbal, and mental activity see JNĀ (AP 226–227).

to how the terms happen to be used.[66] Given my analysis in chapters 4 and 5, it should be clear that the "two mental processes" are not really different, since they are both nothing other than exclusion.

For Jñānaśrīmitra, as for Ratnakīrti, the objects of awareness fall into two neatly defined and mutually exclusive categories—those that are grasped, and therefore free from conceptual construction, and those that are determined, and therefore conceptualized. As is clear from this basic model, perception and inference must have both objects. Thus, according to Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti, perception cannot be free from conceptual construction. Since for Jñānaśrīmitra it is clear that conceptualization is a part of the perceptual process, the problem for him is how to make sense of the traditional claim that "perception is free from conceptual construction." His approach is to insist that this problem is not really a philosophical one about the contents of perception, but rather an exegetical and historical one. It is in response to this exegetical and historical imperative that Jñānaśrīmitra appeals to his theory of conditionally adopted positions.

3.2. *Conditionally Adopted Positions*

In the following passage, Jñānaśrīmitra develops his theory of conditionally adopted positions (*vyavasthā*). He says,

> By relying on a little bit of the truth, a certain conditionally adopted position is constructed for a specific purpose in one way, even though the actual state of affairs is different, just as in examples such as the "self." . . . By relying on [a little bit of the truth, namely,] the conceptual construction of a single continuum, [we conventionally say]: "Who else will experience the [result of an] action done by this very person?," in order to frustrate the deceptive view that there is the passing away of what has been done and the onset of what has not been done.[67]

66. The reason Jñānaśrīmitra thinks that the two terms refer to the same mental process is that, according to him, conceptualization is just a form of determination. When we "conceptually" apprehend something by associating it with a word, for example, we are simply acting upon it verbally. Verbally (vs. nonverbally) referring to objects is a form of activity and is therefore to be included under the broader heading of determination.

67. JNĀ (AP 204.26–205.03): *atra brūmaḥ | iha kācid vyavasthā tattvaleśam āśritya prayojanaviśeṣād anyathā sthitāv apy anyathā kriyate, yathātma{tadutpāda iti | utpādo hi prāgabhāvaviśiṣta-*

A conditionally adopted position is a kind of philosophically sanctioned "white lie"—a statement that is only partially true and is used only for specific, and philosophically legitimate, purposes. Jñānaśrīmitra explains how conditionally adopted positions work by providing an example: in explaining the theory of karma, a Buddhist philosopher may legitimately say that a person will experience in the future the karmic results of actions that (s)he now performs. Yet this is not really true, because there is no "person" who endures through time. The statement is, however, based on a "little bit of the truth," namely, that people generally do construct a mental continuum that they (mis)take to be an enduring "person/self." Jñānaśrīmitra explains that it is even legitimate for this partially true statement to be used in contexts where one needs to expose as false the view that our current actions do not have karmic consequences (or the view that we may experience karmic consequences that are not the result of *our* previous actions). While the statement that there is an enduring self is strictly speaking false, in certain contexts it may serve an important pedagogical function. In this context, for example, its function is to disabuse people of the idea that there is no karma. Elsewhere Jñānaśrīmitra points out that ordinary people cannot function without such convenient fictions and that asking them to do so—by insisting, for example, that they no longer make use of concepts such as a self—would just leave them mentally exhausted.[68]

Jñānaśrīmitra makes it absolutely clear that this theory of conditionally adopted positions and his earlier discussion of conceptualization and determination are directly relevant for understanding what Dignāga and Dharmakīrti have to say about perception. He says,

sya vastunaḥ sata eva dharmaḥ | atha ca prāgabhāvalakṣaṇatattvaleśam āśrityāsata iti vyavasthāpyate satkāryavādaśaṅkāsaṅkocāya} yathā vā 'nenaiva kṛtaṃ karma ko 'nyaḥ, pratyanubhavisyatīty ekasantānaprajñaptim āśritya kṛtanāśākṛtābhyāgamavañcanā vimohāya. For hints of such an idea in the work of his predecessors see PV 3.218–3.219, quoted in Dreyfus 1997:104 n. 71 and Dunne 2004:55 n. 5; see also Dreyfus 1997:83, 99. For Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi's commentary on PV 3.194–224, see Dunne 2004:396–411.See also PVABh *ad* PV 3.218–220 (p. 289) for a seemingly explicit parallel to this idea. Dunne 2004 also points to Ratnāvalī 61.94–97, BCA 9.3–9.4, De Breet 1992, and Pye 2003. For a discussion of this idea in the work of Bhartṛhari see Houben 1995:16–18. See also Kajiyama 1978, cited in McClintock 2002:70.

68. This is clearly implied in a number of different places. See, for example, JNĀ (AP 227.10–227.11), which is quoted in note 78, and JNĀ (AP 231.07–231.10), which is quoted in note 80. Note Dunne 2004:66, where, in commenting on Dreyfus 1997:49, he says, "one can bend beings' minds just so far before they snap."

> It is for this very same reason[69] that—with a view toward the practically oriented person whose mind has [already] worn itself out with the mistaken idea [that conceptualizing a thing and apprehending its name are the same]—the qualifier "free from conceptual construction" is included in the definition of perception [by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti], and that in the authoritative text [i.e., Dharmakīrti's *Short Study of the Reason Property*] there is separate mention [of conceptualization and determination] with the words "on the basis of conceptual awareness . . . by determination."[70]

According to Jñānaśrīmitra, both the claim that perception is free from conceptual construction and Dharmakīrti's statement in his *Short Study of the Reason Property*, where the terms "conceptualization" and "determination" are used contrastively, are just conditionally adopted positions—that is, they are white lies. They must be, Jñānaśrīmitra thinks, because it is just not the case that perception is free from conceptual construction, since, as he has pointed out, perception and inference each have a nonconceptual *and* a conceptual (i.e., determined) object.[71] Similarly, it is not the case that conceptualization and determination are different: at best, the two terms just pick out two different ways of referring to the same mental process, namely, exclusion. According to Jñānaśrīmitra, what Dignāga and Dharmakīrti have to say about perception cannot be literally true: neither can really mean what he says. In order to account for their words, therefore, one has to realize that they are just stating conditionally adopted positions, that is, philosophically sanctioned white lies. In the passage just cited, Jñānaśrīmitra only gestures to why such white lies are told: they are told, he says, for the sake of a person who just can't get his mind around the idea that conceptualization can be decoupled from language. Trying to persuade someone of this (at least at

69. The phrase "this very same reason" (*ata eva ca*) refers to JNĀ (AP 227.01–227.04), where Jñānaśrīmitra explicitly states that the assumed difference between conceptualization and determination is just a conditionally adopted position. Given its context, it is clear that in this passage Jñānaśrīmitra is also identifying the traditional claim that "perception is free from conceptual construction" as a conditionally adopted position. JNĀ (AP 227.01–227.04) is quoted in note 73 and is discussed, in context, in McCrea and Patil 2006. It is worth noting that JNĀ (AP 227.05–227.09) is a restatement of the famous summary verse of the AP.

70. JNĀ (AP 227.10–227.11). The reference is to HB 3*.14–3*.15, quoted at JNĀ (AP 225.18–225.19): *ata eva ca tadabhimānamlānamānasaṃ vyavahārikaṃ prati pratyakṣalakṣaṇe kalpanāpoḍhaviśeṣaṇam upādīyate, sūtrato 'pi vikalpād adhyavasāyeneti.*

71. For a discussion of Jñānaśrīmitra's arguments in support of this position see Patil 2007.

this point in her philosophical education) is just too much trouble and in general would be counterproductive. In the final few pages of his *Monograph on Exclusion*, Jñānaśrīmitra explains this in greater detail.

3.3. *The Pedagogical Significance of Dharmakīrti's White Lies*

Jñānaśrīmitra is aware that his discussion of conditionally adopted positions is likely to raise (perhaps troubling) questions for philosophers in his text tradition: Why, for example, did Dharmakīrti need to tell white lies? Why did he speak as if conceptualization and determination are really different? Why does he say that perception is free from conceptual construction when it is not? Jñānaśrīmitra's answer to these questions is based on his idea that what motivates Dharmakīrti's statement that perception is free from conceptual construction is his recognition of the deeply entrenched view that since conceptualization is inextricably linked with language it must be different from determination, which instead has to do with an object's being more generally actionable. Because of this, people do not generally think that the perceptual process involves (or even could involve) conceptualization. After all, don't prelinguistic infants perceive? Thus, as Jñānaśrīmitra sees it, it makes sense for Dharmakīrti to try to use these deeply entrenched views, rather than argue against them directly, even though he knows that they are not strictly speaking correct. For Jñānaśrīmitra, Dharmakīrti's accommodation of these ideas is just a conditionally adopted position. In the following passages Jñānaśrīmitra states this explicitly, and points to the "little bit of the truth" (*tattvaleśa*) on which each of these views is based and identifies the specific "purpose" (*prayojana*) that is served in adopting them.

About the view that conceptualization and determination are really different, Jñānaśrīmitra explains that,

> Just as one concludes that an object has been apprehended through conceptualization, likewise [one concludes that it has been] bound up with the word [that is used to refer to it]. This is because, like the partial image of a thing [in perception][72], [in "conceptual" awareness] too the image of a

72. The conceptual state of awareness that immediately follows "perception" classifies what is being looked at by picking out one aspect of it. To conceptualize what one is looking at as "smoke" (rather than as "gray" or "cloudlike") is for that conceptual state of awareness to contain just an aspect or part of what was grasped by the preceding nonconceptual awareness.

> word appears. Therefore, the conditionally adopted position regarding conceptualization [namely, that it is different from determination] is not based in reality, but is simply indexed to the judgment that "insofar as a person conceives of himself as apprehending a thing, to that extent he likewise conceives of himself as apprehending it together with its name."[73]

For Jñānaśrīmitra, the terminological distinction between conceptualization and determination reveals only that people generally associate the object that they "conceptually" apprehend with the word that they use to refer to it. It is because of this that they mistakenly believe that conceptually apprehending an object and associating it with its name are one and the same thing.[74] When taken together with what Jñānaśrīmitra said in the passage cited earlier, it is clear that it is in order to accommodate this little bit of the truth that Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, and others in the Buddhist epistemological tradition speak as if "conceptualizing" an object (i.e., apprehending it in association with a word that is used to refer to it) and "determining" it (i.e., apprehending it as an object that one can act upon) are different, even though they are one and the same.[75] The "little bit of the truth" on which this conditionally adopted position is based is a truth about how these terms are generally understood. And as Jñānaśrīmitra implies in this and the earlier passage, the specific "purpose" that is served in adopting this position is that by strategically conforming to the way in which these terms are generally used it will eventually become possible to correct people's false ideas about perception.[76]

This usually takes place in conjunction with the memory of prior instances of smoke and in some cases the word "smoke," etc. For a discussion of selectivity in conceptualization see chapters 4 and 5, and Dunne 2004, Kellner 2004a, and Patil 2003.

73. JNĀ (AP 227.01–227.04): *yathā vikalpenāyam aꣳtho gṛhīta iti niścayas tathā śabdena saṃyojya ity api, arthākāraleśavac chabdākārasyāpi sphuraṇāt | tasmād yāvad arthagrahaṇābhimānavān mānavas tāvad abhidhānasaṃyuktagrahaṇābhimānavān apīty avasāyānurodhād eva vikalpavyavasthā na tattvataḥ.*

74. However, as Jñānaśrīmitra suggests, by way of comparison with the "partial image of the thing [in perception]," what is most important about "conceptualization" is that it makes what is grasped by awareness phenomenally available to us, and this is equally true for both perception and inferential/verbal states of awareness. The two modes of awareness are really parallel processes in that appearance and conceptualization/determination are a necessary part of both.

75. This is supposed to explain Dharmakīrti's contrastive use of these terms in his HB.

76. See JNĀ (AP 231.07–231.10). To get an better idea of how conditionally adopted positions about the objects of awareness have been used see JNĀ (AP 205.03–205.09), where Jñānaśrīmitra explains how the conditionally adopted position that exclusion is the object of inferential/verbal states of awareness is used.

Jñānaśrīmitra is now in a position to explain why the statement "perception is free from conceptual construction" is also a conditionally adopted position. According to Jñānaśrīmitra, underlying the—strictly speaking—false statement that "perception is free from conceptual construction" is also a little bit of the truth, namely, that perception does in fact have a nonconceptual object that is grasped in the first part of the perceptual process. Jñānaśrīmitra seems to believe that the reason Dignāga and Dharmakīrti state only this partial truth is that for people who take conceptualization to be necessarily implicated in language, it will be too difficult to accept the idea that conceptualization is a necessary part of perception too. Dignāga and Dharmakīrti therefore work around this limitation by formulating a definition of perception that takes the first step toward clearly identifying the two objects of perception. According to Jñānaśrīmitra, this is the specific purpose that is served in saying that "perception is free from conceptual construction." Although it is just a conditionally adopted position, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti's one-object model of perception (and inference) is still an important step for an ordinary person who, Jñānaśrīmitra suggests, is already "worn out" by having to understand even this much.[77]

An objector soon argues that if all of this is supposed to be for the benefit of ordinary people, then Jñānaśrīmitra's insistence that the one-object model of perceptual awareness is actually supposed to lead the way to a two-object model is just wishful thinking. According to the opponent, ordinary people will never be able to grasp the distinction between what is "perceived"—namely, the grasped object of perception—and what is "conceptualized"—namely, the determined object of perception. As a result, they will be able to understand neither that the phrase "perception is free from conceptualization" is merely a conditionally adopted position nor that the two-object model is philosophically superior. Jñānaśrīmitra writes,

77. I take the analysis in this passage to be supported by the two passages cited above and the scattered references to pereception in his AP. See JNĀ (AP 231.10–231.16), which is quoted below, and the discussion that leads up to it at JNĀ (AP 230.27–231.10), which is discussed, briefly, in the final section of section 3.

> Now, if you say—"For an ordinary person, there is surely a failure to grasp even the difference between what is perceived and what is conceptualized. Thus, a determined fire is just the same as the one that appears"—we say, "no." This is because, [since the determined fire] is due to the recollection of other appearances [of fire, people] make the mistake that there is the appearance of that [determined fire]. In perception, it is possible to show that the appearance of the thing [before one] is in fact different from a conceptual appearance and likewise that this [conceptual appearance] is different from the perceptual appearance, because it is only there[, in perception,] that one can settle on the appearance of a thing. Thus, for [modes of awareness that are] different from that [perception—i.e., language and inference], it is better to deny that [anything—either the grasped or determined object—] is the appearance of a thing. Therefore, it was rightly said that "[This is] conditionally adopted. But really, nothing at all is expressed."[78]

While acknowledging that ordinary people do not usually distinguish between "grasped" and "determined" objects of perception, Jñānaśrīmitra nevertheless argues that it is not difficult to show such a person that there is a clear difference between the grasped image of a perceived object, such as a campfire that is a few meters in front of one, and the conceptual image/object that appears when one recalls or imagines "fire."[79] Furthermore, one can show that many of the properties that we think belong to the fire that we "see"—e.g., its capacity to heat things up—are not directly presented in the grasped visual image, but rather are derived from our memory of previous experiences with fire. Therefore it can be clearly demonstrated that the "fire" that we take ourselves to see—the "fire" that is phenomenally available to us—is actually made up of what is visually present to us (the grasped object that appears in awareness) and what we conceptually construct on the basis

78. JNĀ (AP 231.10–231.16), quoting JNĀ 203.04: *atha pṛthagjanasya dṛśyavikalpyayor apy abhedagraho niyata evety avasito vahniḥ pratibhāsita eveti cet. na, pratibhāsāntarasmaraṇena tatpratibhāsabhramabhramśasya kṛtatvāt | yathā ca vikalpapratibhāsād anya eva vastupratibhāso darśayitum adhyakṣe śakyaḥ, tathā nādhyakṣapratibhāsād anyo 'stīti tatraiva vastupratibhāsaviśrāmāt tadvijātīyasya vastupratibhāsatāvyudāsaḥ śreyān | tasmād yuktam uktam, sthāpyo vācyas tattvato naiva kaścit.*

79. For a similar strategy in the work of Dharmottara see Krasser 1995 and the references in Krasser 1991 to Dharmottara's LPrP.

of our previous experiences (the determined object). Thus, in perception, one can point to a clear distinction between grasped and determined "objects." As a result, even an ordinary person can be shown that perception has both a nonconceptual and a conceptual object and that the phrase "perception is free from conceptual construction" is nothing but a white lie. So, despite the opponent's worries, it is possible to show an ordinary person that the one-object model of perception is a convenient fiction when compared to the philosophically superior two-object model. Thus a specific and philosophically legitimate purpose is served by conditionally adopting the partial truth that perception is free from conceptual construction.

While the one-object model is an important step toward the two-object model of perception, Jñānaśrīmitra confesses near the end of his "Monograph on Exclusion" that the two-object model is itself a white lie. More specifically, he says that although the two-object model is an improvement over Dignāga and Dharmakīrti's "lower-order convention" (*adhara-saṃvṛti*), it is itself still conventional.[80] Jñānaśrīmitra explains that when speaking to an ordinary person who believes that the (momentary) object that is manifest to him and the (temporally extended) object that he takes to be the object of his subsequent activity are one and the same, it is important to say that perception really has two objects, a nonconceptual one (the grasped moment) and a conceptually constructed one (the determined continuum).[81] But at the end of the day Jñānaśrīmitra explains that perception, like inferential/

80. JNĀ (AP 231.07–231.10): "About this, I say: What I have stated is a conditionally adopted position about the way things are. There is 'being an object' only in virtue of the existence of both [manifestation and determination]. The convention is said to be 'the way things really are' just relative to a lower-order convention. This is because for the practically oriented person things are not destroyed at each moment, since pragmatic activity breaks down when one gets down to the division between moments. Even with perception there is really no possibility of both. Thus there is no problem" (*atrocyate | tattvavyavasthām āha, ubhayasaṃbhavenaiva viṣayatvam, kevalaṃ sāṃvyavahārikāpekṣayā saṃvṛter evādharasaṃvṛtim apekṣya tattvam iti vyavahriyate, kṣaṇabhedāvatāre saṃvyavahāravilopād vyāvahārikaṃ prati pratikṣaṇakṣīṇatāyā abhāvāt, tattvataḥ pratyakṣeṇobhayasaṃbhavābhāvaḥ, iti na doṣaḥ*). For an extremely interesting discussion of higher and lower orders of conventional truth see JNĀ (KBhA 6.09–7.24).

81. This is the purpose that is served in conditionally adopting the two-object model. The little bit of the truth on which this model is based is that it is philosophically better to treat perception and inference as parallel processes having two objects each.

verbal awareness, cannot have a real object at all. This is because in order for something to be a genuine object of an awareness-event it must be both available (that is, grasped by that awareness-event) and actionable (that is, determined by it to be an object of activity).[82] This is philosophically the only way to capture our intuitions about what an object of an awareness-event must be. But, as Jñānaśrīmitra argues, nothing can be both grasped *and* determined.[83] Thus, while the two-object model of perception is for philosophical reasons an improvement on the "lower-order convention" of the one-object model, it is still "conventional," and is adopted only conditionally.

3.4. Philosophy and Pedagogy

Jñānaśrīmitra's discussion of Dharmakīrti's white lie provides an interesting framework for understanding his perspective on the pedagogical significance of Buddhist philosophy.[84] According to Jñānaśrīmitra, his predecessors in the Buddhist epistemological tradition used convenient fictions and partial truths to philosophically educate those who they felt were in error. This is clear from Jñānaśrīmitra's example of how the idea of an enduring self can be used to argue against those who do not accept karma. By standing on a rung of the philosophical stepladder higher than that of their targeted audience, Jñānaśrīmitra's predecessors were able to reach down and help people up to the next philosophical rung, even if (according to Jñānaśrīmitra) they themselves realized that this next rung was not the final one. It is because of their privileged position on the ladder that Jñānaśrīmitra seems to think that Dignāga and Dharmakīrti were able to clearly see, and therefore affect, what was going on below. The situation is no different for Jñānaśrīmitra himself. It is from a philosophical vantage point one step up the ladder that he is able to identify and expose Dharmakīrti's white lies and conditionally adopted positions to those who are not already aware of them.

According to Jñānaśrīmitra, the way that one learns to move up from rung to rung of this ladder is by discovering conceptual problems inherent in how we speak about awareness and its objects. By discovering specific conceptual problems with the one-object model, for example, Jñānaśrīmitra

82. For a discussion of this see chapter 4 and chapter 5.

83. JNĀ (AP 231.07–231.10).

84. See Dreyfus 1997:443–462.

expects us to move up to his two-object model. Similarly, by coming to see conceptual problems inherent in how we speak about awareness and its objects from within the two-object model, he expects us to move up to his no-object model. In both cases conceptual problems become apparent through discovering how each model is based on a partial truth about the nature of awareness and its objects. It is important that the philosophical issues at stake have to do with the nature of awareness and the kinds of mental objects and processes that best account for it. Given the subordination of ontology to the philosophy of mind in Jñānaśrīmitra's text tradition, this is also just what one would expect.[85] Philosophy, then, is of pedagogical significance, since it is through philosophical analysis and argumentation that a teacher like Jñānaśrīmitra is able to help his "students" move up from rung to rung of a philosophical stepladder.[86] For Jñānaśrīmitra too, philosophy is supposed to change people's minds by turning them away from their false or partially true views and toward those that are more correct.[87]

The internal logic of Jñānaśrīmitra's account of conditionally adopted positions suggests that there are at least three levels of analysis (or rungs on the philosophical stepladder), in addition to a basement level of false views.[88] The first level is the one on which Jñānaśrīmitra discovers there to be a conditionally adopted position. In Jñānaśrīmitra's "Monograph on Exclusion," this first level is characterized by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti's statements about valid states of awareness and their object(s). More specifically, on level 1, perception is said to be free from conceptual construction and to have only

85. I think that Dreyfus (1997) is right to emphasize the relative importance of issues in epistemology (and the philosophy of mind) over those having to do with ontology. Cf. the analysis in Dunne 2004:61–63.

86. It is worth noting that this is only one reason that Jñānaśrīmitra thinks that philosophy is of value.

87. Cf. Griffiths 1999a.

88. See Dreyfus 1997:83–105, McClintock 2002:68–72, and Dunne 2004:53–79 for three very interesting accounts of this model. For a critical discussion of these accounts see Kellner (forthcoming) and Kyuma (forthcoming). The strategy that I am describing here has been described in the context of Dharmakīrti's work as a "strategy of ascending scales of analysis" (Dreyfus 1997; cf. Phillips 1987:243ff.) and "sliding scales of analysis" (Dunne 2004:53, McClintock 2002:68–76, 203, 139ff,). In these models four levels of analysis are usually identified. Dreyfus and Dunne describe them as follows: level 1: common sense/beliefs of ordinary people; level 2: alternative interpretation/*abhidharma* typology; level 3: standard interpretation/external realism (Sautrāntika); level 4: *yogācāra*/epistemic idealism.

a real particular as its object. Similarly, according to Jñānaśrīmitra, it is also a conditionally adopted position to say that inferential/verbal states of awareness are inherently conceptual and have only an exclusion as their object.[89] Like perception, inferential/verbal states of awareness also have two objects.[90] In this numbering scheme, the views that Dignāga and Dharmakīrti themselves argue against—e.g., the views of non-Buddhists—are in the "basement," at level 0. This is also the level on which Jñānaśrīmitra himself seems to place such views.[91] Unlike the philosophical claims made on level 1, however, the claims made on level 0 are not white lies, but only falsehoods.

Level 2 is the level on which a position is conditionally adopted by Jñānaśrīmitra himself: this is the level of Jñānaśrīmitra's own conditionally adopted two-object model of valid awareness. On this level, it is clear that perception is not free from conceptual construction, since it can be shown that it has two objects—a grasped object and a determined/conceptualized one.[92] Similarly, it is clear that inferential/verbal awareness does not have just an exclusion as its object, since it too has two objects—a grasped object and a determined/conceptualized one. It is, moreover, only from the vantage point of level 2 that the position adopted on level 1 can be seen to be just a conditionally adopted one.[93] Level 2 is also the level that Jñānaśrīmitra relies upon in criticizing his opponent's views, such as the existence of Īśvara, and on the basis of which he establishes his own philosophical positions, such as selflessness/momentariness and the efficacy of the Buddhist path. The top level is level 3, the level from which Jñānaśrīmitra's own conditionally adopted position on level 2 can be identified as such, and on which no position is itself adopted conditionally. This is the level of Jñānaśrīmitra's view that neither perception nor inference really has an object at all.

Jñānaśrīmitra's theory of conditionally adopted positions also suggests that for him the second of the three levels of analysis is the highest level of conventional truth and that the levels below it are just lower-order conventions.[94] This is confirmed by Jñānaśrīmitra himself, who clearly believes that

89. JNĀ (AP 202.21–203.25), (AP 205.03–205.09).

90. JNĀ (AP 225.17), (VC 166.13–166.15).

91. For example, see Kyuma 2005:lxxx–lxxxiv, 77–79 n. 99.

92. JNĀ (AP 225.17), (VC 166.13–166.15).

93. JNĀ (AP 226.01–226.03).

94. JNĀ (KBhA 6.09–7.24). For a translation and discussion of this see Kyuma 2005, esp. p. 77 n. 99.

the second level of analysis provides the philosophically most rigorous way for us to speak about perception and inference and their objects. According to him, his two-object model thus provides the best philosophical theory of perception and inference. Although it is the most philosophically rigorous way for us to understand states of awareness and their objects, it is still a white lie, since awareness-events do not really have an "object" at all. Thus, the best philosophical account that can be given of the contents of perception and inference is ultimately still not the case. Relative to level 1, it is just a higher-order convention (*uttara-saṃvṛtti*).[95] As his discussion makes clear, an analysis of the two-object model of awareness reveals that it too is a white lie and that it is, in fact, a no-object model of awareness that provides the most rigorous philosophical account of awareness and is, therefore, what is ultimately the case. The pedagogical purpose of Jñānaśrīmitra's multiple-content model of awareness is thus to first turn people away from their false/partially true views on level 1 and then, after providing them a place to rest, lead them to level 3.[96]

4. Ratnakīrti's Framework of Values

In his "Demonstration of Exclusion," Ratnakīrti effectively writes out Jñānaśrīmitra's discussion of conditionally adopted positions, and in so doing reveals an important difference between himself and his teacher. While Jñānaśrīmitra is deeply concerned with accounting for apparent inconsistencies between his work and that of the foundational figures of his text tradition,

95. Kyuma 2005:lxxx–lxxxiv and the references contained therein.

96. What this model suggests is that within a single philosophical text an author may choose to argue from various philosophical perspectives that are not his own in order to win a particular argument. The philosophical (and soteriological) hierarchy of these various perspectives is supposed to ensure that this approach is not philosophically dishonest, since in making arguments that are rhetorically effective a philosopher who adopts this strategy hopes to persuade members of his target audience to give up philosophical positions that he thinks are not only genuinely mistaken, but mistaken for the reasons that he provides. Since different audiences are likely to be persuaded by arguments from different philosophical perspectives, however, it may appear as if a philosopher who adopts this method is deeply confused. But when it is understood that what he is trying to do is to philosophically educate someone by helping him make better and better mistakes—until he comes to the "right" or "maximally correct" answer—the charge of being confused loses its force.

Ratnakīrti is not. Relative to Jñānaśrīmitra, Ratnakīrti is indifferent to such historical and exegetical concerns. Instead, Ratnakīrti's arguments are devoted almost exclusively to the dual purpose discussed above. While Jñānaśrīmitra too has this dual purpose in view, he infuses it with a level of historical sensitivity and interest that Ratnakīrti does not seem to share. Jñānaśrīmitra also adds to it an explicitly intra-Buddhist concern. When Ratnakīrti does argue against other Buddhists in his own work—e.g., Dharmottara (but not Dignāga or Dharmakīrti)—he treats their views in the same way as he treats those of non-Buddhists. Their views are not white lies or partial truths: they are just falsehoods. This is not to say that Ratnakīrti would not agree with what Jñānaśrīmitra has to say about conditionally adopted positions, but only that he chooses to suppress such questions in order to focus on others. That this was a conscious decision on his part is obvious when one compares Jñānaśrīmitra's "Monograph on Exclusion" with Ratnakīrti's "Demonstration of Exclusion." It is precisely the passages in which Jñānaśrīmitra develops the idea of conditionally adopted positions that Ratnakīrti skips over in his reconstruction of his teacher's text.

While Ratnakīrti suppresses the idea of conditionally adopted positions, he seems to accept the pedagogical role that Jñānaśrīmitra assigns to epistemology on the basis of it. Ratnakīrti's work can thus be seen in terms of a tripartite pedagogical structure, but one that is rather different in character from that of his teacher's. For Ratnakīrti, the *first level* of analysis is defined by the views of his opponents, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist. As I have argued, this level includes both the specific philosophical positions that are being argued for and the epistemology that supports them. This corresponds to Jñānaśrīmitra's "basement"—that is, level 0 (which is also how I will refer to it when discussing Ratnakīrti's tripartite pedagogical structure). Ratnakīrti's *second level* of analysis includes his own philosophical views—e.g., momentariness—and the epistemology that supports them. As I have argued, it is by looking down from this level, and subtly drawing from it, that Ratnakīrti fashions his "internal critique" of positions on level 0. This is in contrast with Jñānaśrīmitra, who looks down from this level not only to level 0 but also to level 1 (a level that Ratnakīrti all but ignores). As with Jñānaśrīmitra, for Ratnakīrti too, the *third level* is defined by the view that neither perception nor inference really has an "object" at all.

In Ratnakīrti's work what is emphasized is the transition from level 0 to level 2. While Ratnakīrti ignores level 1, the transition from level 2 to level 3 is acknowledged, but deemphasized. This is consistent with Ratnakīrti's

understanding of the dual purpose of his work, which is to argue (1) against the views of others, in order to turn them away from level 0, and (2) in support of his own, so that he may bring them up to level 2, the highest level of conventional truth. It is on level 2 that the selflessness/momentariness-thesis is located and the efficacy of the path is established through the omniscience-inference.

Where then does this leave us with respect to the question of how Ratnakīrti understood why epistemology, and philosophy more generally, was of value? As I have argued in this chapter, Ratnakīrti inherits a framework of value from his text tradition that he both builds upon and modifies, in part, by embedding it in a pedagogical framework that he takes from his teacher Jñānaśrīmitra. Ratnakīrti's framework is built around four identifiable goals: (1) to refute his opponents' philosophical views and the epistemology that supports them; (2) to establish his own philosophical views and the epistemology that supports them; (3) to establish, more specifically, his selflessness/momentariness thesis; and (4) to establish that meditating upon selflessness/momentariness can lead to omniscience—that is, the direct awareness of *dharma* itself.[97]

Ratnakīrti's acceptance of Jñānaśrīmitra's pedagogical framework, which envisions philosophy (at least in part) as an instrument for moving up from level to level on the philosophical stepladder of the Buddhist epistemological tradition, suggests that these four goals are interlinked. Success in goal 1, for example, is a prerequisite for success in goal 2. Without having refuted the philosophical views of his opponents that are incompatible with his own, it seems unlikely that Ratnakīrti would be in a position to convince someone of his own views. In the case of the Naiyāyikas, for example, without arguing successfully against the existence of Īśvara—the paradigmatic example of an enduring self—it seems unlikely that Ratnakīrti would be in a position to convince them that all existing things are momentary. Arguing against an opponent's epistemology supports this effort by undermining the basis for any of the opponent's conclusions. It thus creates a context in which an alternative epistemology might be considered. Success in goal 1 is supposed to turn someone away from their false views (on level 0) and thereby encourage them to seek an alternative by looking up to level 2. Goal 2 is somewhat different

97. Since goal 3 and goal 4 can easily be included in goal 2, the structure of Ratnakīrti's goals are clearly in line with the "dual purpose" of his text tradition.

from goal 1, in that it requires Ratnakīrti to establish his own epistemology, and at least some of the philosophical views that it supports. Success in this goal is supposed to bring someone up to level 2, and thus make success in goals 3 and 4 possible. Without being able to establish the epistemological principles on the basis of which his own philosophical views are founded, it seems unlikely that Ratnakīrti would be in a position to support his views. More specifically, without establishing his own views on pervasion and inferential reasoning more generally, how could he establish momentariness? Success in goal 2, like success in goal 1, puts the opponent/student in a new epistemic position. Just as goal 1 is a prerequisite for goal 2, goal 2 is a prerequisite for goal 3. And given that goal 3 has been reached, all of the pieces are finally in place to reach goal 4, and thus climb up to level 3. In the pedagogical structure that is implied by Ratnakīrti's work, the goals are clearly sequential.[98]

It is in relation to these four goals that both the instrumental and the epistemic value of philosophy becomes apparent. Given that Ratnakīrti seeks to refute his opponents' philosophical views and the epistemology that supports them (goal 1), I have argued that it is instrumentally rational for him to argue against those views and their supporting epistemology by internally criticizing them. As I discussed in chapters 2 and 3, this is exactly what Ratnakīrti tries to do in his arguments against the Īśvara-inference. In the context of goal 1, these arguments can be seen as having instrumental value for him insofar as he thinks they will turn his opponents away from their false views about the Īśvara-inference and the epistemology that supports it. Similarly, in his other work Ratnakīrti seeks to establish his own views and the epistemology that supports them (goal 2).[99] As I argued in chapters 4 and 5, in the context of this goal it is instrumentally rational for him to fashion his arguments against the Īśvara-inference by gesturing to and drawing upon his own philosophical views. Adopting this strategy in the context of goal 1 clearly supports Ratnakīrti's interest in achieving goal 2. Finally, given that he seeks to establish both his momentariness thesis and the omniscience-inference (goals 3–4), it is instrumentally rational for him to write the texts

98. It is worth noting that achieving goal 4 is supposed to lead to action on the part of the student, which is different from the results of achieving goals 1–3. Achieving goals 1–3 leads to new views and not to any specific action, per se.

99. See the texts referred to in section 2.4.

that he does, and to highlight the connections between them. For Ratnakīrti, the instrumental value of epistemology and philosophy more generally is based on his view that it is the only way to achieve goals 1–4.[100]

Instrumental rationality and instrumental value are, however, insufficient for explaining how Ratnakīrti understands the value of his work. For example, as I have argued, instrumental rationality explains why Ratnakīrti tries to criticize the Naiyāyikas on their own terms, by showing them that they have not and cannot certify the inference-instrument in the Īśvara-inference. Given that Ratnakīrti has the goal of refuting his opponents and turning them toward his own views, "instrumental rationality" can help us to understand why Ratnakīrti argued in the way that he did and why he thought it was of value. What it does not explain, however, is why Ratnakīrti thinks any of his arguments will work, especially since his opponents do not share any of the same relevant goals.

In my view, Ratnakīrti does not think that it is *instrumentally* rational for his Naiyāyikas to accept his analysis. Rather, he thinks that it is *epistemically* rational for them to do so. Consider, for example, Ratnakīrti's analysis of the defect "inconclusive" (H_3). Given Ratnakīrti's cognitive goals, it is instrumentally rational for him to find a counterexample to the pervasion relation in the Īśvara-inference.[101] Responding to the counterexample itself, however, cannot be supposed by Ratnakīrti to be instrumentally rational for his opponents—rather it must be epistemically so. We are not told of any goal that they possess in relation to which accepting that their Īśvara-inference is defeated would be instrumentally rational. While Ratnakīrti possesses the goal of turning his Naiyāyikas away from their false views, and thus possesses the goal of identifying a counterexample to the pervasion relation in their Īśvara-inference, his Naiyāyikas do not. Yet it is clear from Ratnakīrti's analysis (especially given the "dual purpose" of his work) that he expects his Naiyāyikas to accept his counterexample, even though it is clear that doing

100. That this is the *only* way for him to achieve goals 1–4 is never stated explicitly. I take this to be the case, however, since according to him the only proper object of meditation is one that has been established by a conventionally valid source of knowledge, which suggests that epistemology, and philosophy more generally, is necessary, at least for achieving goals 2–4. While philosophy may not be necessary for goal 1, the only way that Ratnakīrti seeks to achieve it in his written work is through philosophy.

101. This corresponds to goal 1, discussed above.

so would hinder them from achieving their own cognitive goals.[102] He expects his analysis to have categorical normative force—that is, to be binding on any rational agent regardless of that agent's interests or goals.[103] While it is instrumentally rational to find a counterexample, he takes it to be epistemically rational for him, and for his Naiyāyikas, to accept the counterexample as a counterexample to pervasion.[104] While one might argue that accepting this is instrumentally rational for Ratnakīrti, since it is in service of his cognitive goals, it is certainly not the case that Ratnakīrti thinks that his Naiyāyikas will accept this because they take it to be in service of some cognitive goal that they possess. Similarly, given that Ratnakīrti has the cognitive goal of turning his opponents toward the *dharma*, it is instrumentally rational for him to establish the epistemology that supports his own philosophical views and, more specifically, his selflessness/momentariness thesis and omniscience-inference.[105] However, if his tripartite pedagogical structure is to work, his opponents must also accept his arguments, even though they may not (yet) share any of the goals that motivate Ratnakīrti or are implicit in his version of the stepladder.[106] It seems clear, therefore, that Ratnakīrti takes himself to be providing compelling, categorical reasons for his views, and not just reasons that are compelling for those who may possess the right sort of goals.[107] Thus Ratnakīrti sees his philosophical work as exhibiting both instrumental and epistemic rationality and as having both instrumental value and epistemic value. Unlike the instrumental value of his work, which is indexed to the achievement of his goals, its epistemic value is a kind of "final value"—it is valuable for its own sake, and not just for some end.

102. See Kelly (forthcoming), which is a response to Leite (forthcoming).

103. One might object that while accepting Ratnakīrti's analysis might hinder and frustrate some of the Naiyāyikas' goals, it is still in service of their more general and overarching cognitive and epistemic goal of having more correct views than incorrect ones. On such an "instrumentalist" response, epistemic rationality would be reduced to a species of instrumental rationality.

104. Whether any Naiyāyika would actually accept his analysis is a different matter. What is relevant here is only that Ratnakīrti expects them to do so.

105. This corresponds, roughly, to goals 2–4, discussed above.

106. Once they are on level 2 and have achieved goal 2, and perhaps goal 3, however, it seems as though they are expected to shift from being "opponents" to being "students."

107. See Kelly 2003:621.

5. Conclusion: Religious Reasoning as Religious Practice

The two-dimensional framework of value that I have argued Ratnakīrti shares with his text tradition contributes to our understanding of how Buddhist epistemologists (and perhaps Buddhist philosophers more generally) understood the nature of their work and its value. As I have argued, this framework and the pedagogical structure in which it is embedded provides us with an important perspective on what members of this text tradition took their work to be all about. Although there has been a great deal of skepticism (if not outright hostility) to the idea that Buddhist epistemology is important for understanding "Buddhism," it should be clear that the Buddhist epistemological tradition itself saw a very close relationship between philosophical work and the Buddhist path, as they understood it.[108] Ratnakīrti's work further suggests that, at least for him, the essence of the Buddha's teaching can be captured in the momentariness/selflessness thesis.[109] As I have tried to show in this chapter, thinking that broader religious concerns did not inform the technical philosophical work of Buddhist epistemologists like Ratnakīrti is, simply put, a mistake.[110]

Although Ratnakīrti and his text tradition agree that *dharma* itself is inaccessible to "reasoning," they still insist that philosophical work is necessary for realizing *dharma*. The primary reason for this is that it is *only* through philosophical analysis—and inferential reasoning, more specifically—that momentariness can be established as the proper object of meditation. Simply accepting the momentariness thesis on other grounds is insufficient, since in such cases it will crumble in the face of critical analysis. Only when

108. See Krasser 2004, Steinkellner 1982, and Kapstein 2001:22–23 n. 13 for a discussion of how earlier scholars understood this issue. See also Davidson 2002:102–105.

109. This view is of course not just restricted to Ratnakīrti. In addition, see for example TS vv. 1–6 and TSP *ad* TS vv. 1–6, which are beautifully translated in Kapstein 2001:10, 14, and MMK vv. 1–2 and MMK 24.18a–b, which are also translated in Kapstein 2001:24 n. 22, 23. See also Kapstein 2001:13, 15 for a brief description of Śāntarakṣita's "dual purpose" and the relationship between it and momentariness and omniscience. For the importance of omniscience and its centrality to the path, see McClintock 2002:1, 5, where she strongly underscores this point.

110. Krasser (2004) makes this same point, with specific reference to the Buddhist epistemological tradition. For excellent work on Dharmakīrti as a philosopher of religion see Eltschinger 2005a, Eltschinger 2005b, Eltschinger 2007b. Some of this work has also been discussed in Eltschinger 2007a. For work on Śāntarakṣita see Funayama (forthcoming).

it is the object of a conventionally valid awareness-event will it be fixed enough in one's mind to serve as a proper object of meditation/cultivation.[111] One way to understand Ratnakīrti's confidence in this claim is to see that for him it is *both* instrumentally and epistemically rational to accept the momentariness thesis. It is, therefore, the categorical normative force of his inferential arguments that seems to be the source of his confidence. What is important is not just an awareness of momentariness, but a certified valid awareness of it, which is only possible by working within the sources of knowledge framework of the Buddhist epistemological tradition as understood by Ratnakīrti.

When embedded in Ratnakīrti's tripartite pedagogical structure, the two-dimensional framework of instrumental and epistemic values also helps us to understand exactly what Ratnakīrti hoped to gain in criticizing his opponents as he did. Attending to Ratnakīrti's use of instrumental rationality (as defined by his four goals) in the context of his pedagogical framework shows that Ratnakīrti expected his arguments to be persuasive—to actually turn his opponents away from their false views and bring them closer to the *dharma*, by convincing them that all existing things are momentary and that it is possible, by meditating on momentariness, for the *dharma* itself to be manifest in awareness.[112] The fact that his critique of the Īśvara-inference is phrased as an internal one that targets both the inference itself and the epistemology that supports it is, therefore, not at all insignificant. As I have argued, given his goals, it is instrumentally rational for him to argue in just this way. The reason he expects his specific arguments to work is because of their epistemic rationality. As I have argued, Ratnakīrti expects his arguments to have categorical normative force, that is, to be binding on any rational agent, regardless of that agent's interests or goals.[113] To think that Ratnakīrti understood his work, and by extension the work of others in his

111. See McClintock 2002: chaps. 1, 3, 5, and 8.

112. See Griffiths 1999a and Griffiths 1999b for an extended argument against this view in Buddhist philosophy more generally and in the work of the Buddhist epistemologist Mokṣākaragupta more specifically.

113. It is, of conrse, a separate question whether such arguments were in fact effective. See Griffiths 1999b:517–519 for a discussion of this point, and a short response in McClintock 2002:31 n.14. See also McClintock 2002:38–42 for a discussion of how such "rational agents"—whom she refers to as "judicious persons" (*prekṣāvant*)—were conceived of by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. Also see her discussion of Griffiths 1999a and Griffiths 1999b in McClintock 2002:31–38.

text tradition, as being part of an entirely (or even primarily) "tradition internal conversation" not only disregards what Ratnakīrti himself says about it but denies that his work displays epistemic rationality.[114] As I have argued, attention to epistemic rationality helps us to see that Ratnakīrti expected his arguments not only to lead to valid awareness-events but to be persuasive because of it.

The pedagogical stepladder that I have argued is implicit in Ratnakīrti's work also reveals the importance of a "problems and arguments" approach to philosophical work, even within a structured hierarchy that culminates in a call for action (in the form of cultivation/meditation).[115] Each rung on Ratnakīrti's stepladder is constituted by his engagement with very specific philosophical problems. His sustained and detailed arguments against the Īśvara-inference are hardly atypical, and in fact are characteristic of much of his critical work (on level 0). His arguments in support of his theories of pervasion, exclusion, and mental images (on level 2) similarly display his commitment to detail and philosophical rigor. This is not at all surprising since, as I have argued, these theories are the cornerstones of his own epistemology. Even more extensive is his defense of his momentariness thesis (also on level 2). As I have argued, on each of these levels Ratnakīrti tries to provide compelling, categorical reasons for his views and thus seeks to improve his opponent's epistemic position with respect to a structured set of goals that Ratnakīrti has, but his opponents do not.[116] Moreover, it is his

114. This term is from Griffiths 1999a. In Griffiths 1999b:506, Griffiths argues that the arguments of the Buddhist epistemologist Mokṣākaragupta were not intended by him to be persuasive; Griffiths' essay suggests, also, that this is a typical characteristic of such arguments. For a powerful argument in support of his view see Griffiths 1999a.

115. This phrase is from Kapstein 2001:5.

116. This is certainly the case with respect to level 1. With respect to level 2, it may be the case that some of Ratnakīrti's opponents have now become students and so share his goals. Even so, it is by responding to Ratnakīrti's epistemic reasons that they can improve their epistemic position with respect to their own goals. Kelly (2003:634) explains this with the following example: "Suppose that I hear a strange and unexpected sound behind me, and, seeking to find out the source of this noise, I turn around. Here, the reason I have to turn around is an instrumental reason—I have the (cognitive) goal of finding out what is responsible for the relevant noise, and given this goal, it is instrumentally rational for me to change my epistemic position in a certain way. Suppose further that, upon turning around, I discover the source of the noise: a cat has entered the otherwise-empty room. Finding myself face-to-face with the cat, it is now epistemically rational for me to believe that a cat was responsible for the noise."

commitment to these arguments, especially those having to do with the nature of awareness-events and their "objects" that leads him to the no-object model of awareness (on level 3). In my view, it is clear from Ratnakīrti's work that he thought that solving philosophical problems and defending his solutions to them were among his most important intellectual tasks.

While the rungs of Ratnakīrti's stepladder are constituted by philosophical problems and arguments and are focused on improving his opponent's epistemic position with respect to a set of goals, its structural hierarchy is determined by both philosophical and soteriological concerns that are informed by Ratnakīrti's understanding of the Buddhist path. In relation to soteriological concerns and goals, philosophical activity is clearly taken to be a form of religious practice in which it is instrumentally rational (and in fact necessary) to engage. Attention to Ratnakīrti's framework of values and tripartite pedagogical structure thus enables us to see exactly what sort of a practice it is, and exactly how Ratnakīrti thinks it is relevant to the Buddhist path. From Ratnakīrti's work, philosophical activity, as a form of religious practice, improves one's epistemic position with respect to a soteriological goal, by both removing one's false views and fixing the right views in one's mind through very detailed and deliberate philosophical analysis.[117] Built into this work is the expectation that once in this new epistemic position one will display epistemic rationality and accept Ratnakīrti's conclusions. On Ratnakīrti's model, religious reasoning is a "hybrid virtue" that requires that one be sensitive to both instrumental and epistemic reasons.[118]

Ratnakīrti's work thus provides a model for religious reasoning according to which, by responding to both instrumental and epistemic reasons, a truly rational agent is able to climb up a philosophical stepladder, and thus put herself in a proper epistemic position to one day become omniscient and

117. Exactly how this sort of development is related to *philosophia*, as famously suggested by Hadot (1995), is not obvious. For a discussion of this issue in the work of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla see Kapstein 2001:7–11, 19–20 and McClintock 2002:6–8. The comparison of *philosophia* with Buddhist philosophy as practiced within what Kapstein (2001) refers to as a "Madhyamaka architecture" seems more appropriate than with the work of Ratnakīrti and others in his text tradition. This is in part because the explicit discussion of philosophy as a kind of therapy is nearly absent from Ratnakīrti's work, and certainly is not emphasized.

118. I take this from Kelly 2003:637.

see *dharma* itself. Ratnakīrti's arguments against the existence of Īśvara can thus be seen as the first step in the philosophical and religious education of his Nyāya opponents. While religious reasoning is necessary for progressing on the path, and is therefore a form of religious practice, it is itself insufficient for realizing *dharma*. As Ratnakīrti explains, meditation/cultivation is also necessary. What is necessary for this practice to be successful, however, is something about which Ratnakīrti's texts are interestingly (and perhaps importantly) silent.[119]

119. For an excellent discussion of how Kamalaśīla's account of the relevance of philosophy to the path relates to what we generally take to be a more traditional understanding of Buddhist "practice," see Funayama 2005 and Funayama (forthcoming), where he explores the connection between the process that I have described in this chapter and the "realms/stages of a Boddhisattva" (*boddhisattvabhūmi*), especially the first (*pramudita-bhūmi*). Also note BhK3 30.03–30.08, where Kamalaśīla equates this first stage on the Boddhisattva path to the "path of seeing" (*darśanamārga*). For an explicit equation of Ratnakīrti's "fourth goal" with such "practice" see Vinītadeva's commentary to Dharmakīrti's NB, NBṬ-Vi 47.4–47.12, e.g., where he explains that in the practice that "leads to insight" (*nirvedhabhāgīya*) the object of meditation is the four noble truths. As noted in Funayama 2005:4 n. 11, Kamalaśīla's account in BhK1 224.7–224.10 is different: he takes the object of meditation in the practice that leads to insight to be a type of nonduality. Funayama's analysis suggests that Ratnakīrti too would take success in his fourth goal to lead to just the first of the ten stages on the Boddhisattva path. Far from being the end of one's soteriological journey, this is just the beginning. For a discussion of Kamalaśīla's *Bhāvanākrama*, see Adam 2002.

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