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HARĀNANDALAHARĪ

Volume in Honour of Professor Minoru Hara
on his Seventieth Birthday

edited by
Ryutaro Tsuchida and Albrecht Wezler

Dr. Inge Wezler
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A Note on the Origin of *Ahiṃsā*¹

LAMBERT SCHMITHAUSEN, Hamburg

As is well known, the question of the origin of *ahiṃsā* — in the sense of an attitude or mode of life characterized by *consistently* abstaining from injuring and especially killing any living, sentient being, but not necessarily associated with vegetarianism — is highly controversial. Scholars like H.-P. SCHMIDT (1968; 1997), J.C. HEESTERMAN (1984) and H.W. TULL (1996) have tried to derive *ahiṃsā* from developments within ritualist Vedic tradition. As against this, H.W. BODEWITZ² has decidedly argued for asceticism as the starting-point of *ahiṃsā* — not necessarily non-Vedic, but at any rate antiritualist asceticism. Actually, *ahiṃsā* as a perseverant, pervasive mode of life is firmly established in the most important non-Vedic ascetic movements, viz. Jainism and Buddhism, and it is clear that it is in the first place a constitutive element of the mode of life of renunciants and has only secondarily, in a mitigated form, been extended to lay followers.³ The situation in the Vedic tradition is less clear. To be sure, there are some occurrences of *ahiṃsā* in the Chāndogya-Upaniṣad and the Dharmasūtras,⁴ and in the latter it is, once again, especially the wandering ascetic (*parivrāja*) in connection with whom we find *ahiṃsā* described in a comparatively comprehensive and concrete form (although the term itself is not used).⁵ But the chronology of these passages is anything but certain,⁶ and the

¹ I am very grateful to M. Maithrimurthi, S.A. Srinivasan, Tilmann Vetter, Albrecht Wezler and Eva Wilden for kindly having read a draft of this paper and for most valuable suggestions, and to S.A. Srinivasan also for correcting my English. The responsibility is, of course, mine.

² 1999 esp. 35ff. 40f. Cf. also HOUBEN 1999: esp. 124f n. 35. TÄHTINEN (1976: 131-133) explicitly suggests pre-Aryan roots of the Śramaṇic *ahiṃsā*, which he distinguishes from "Vedic *ahiṃsā*" taken to be limited to abstention from non-sacrificial killing and injuring and regarded as "not so old as the ascetic idea".

³ BODEWITZ 1999: 35. Cf. also SCHMITHAUSEN 1991a: p. 38.

⁴ BODEWITZ 1999: 26 and 37-40.

⁵ GauDhS 1.1.3.19 and 22 (BÜHLER: 3.20 and 23): no injuring of plants and seeds, and perhaps 24 (BÜHLER: 3.25) *anārambhī*, which, viewed from Jaina terminology, may also mean "characterized by not acting violently"; BauDhS 2.[6.]11.23: not harming any beings by verbal, mental or physical violence (*vān-manah-karma-daṇḍair bhūtānām adrohi*); no reference to non-injury in ĀpDhS 2 [9] 12.1-17.

Dharmasūtras themselves express reserves against this mode of life.⁷ According to BODEWITZ (1999: 30) "the Brahmanical *ahiṃsā* developed so late and hesitantly that it hardly formed an equal partner of the Jain and Buddhist representatives, let alone that it could have inspired them as a source." Even Jainism and Buddhism (as we have them) do not seem to have invented *ahiṃsā* as an element of ascetic life but rather to have adopted it from an older ascetic tradition,⁸ which in the case of Jainism is connected with the name of Pārśva⁹. Thus, the "origin" of *ahiṃsā* as a mode of life seems to be no longer directly accessible,¹⁰ and hence a matter of reasoning or conjecture.

It is not the aim of the present paper to present another hypothesis for the precise social location of the "origin" of *ahiṃsā*. What I am rather concerned with is the question of the *motive(s)* underlying its genesis. To be sure, an answer to this question, too, is complicated by the fact that the "origin" of *ahiṃsā* is no longer directly accessible. Yet, in this case it seems possible to discover the missing link, or missing links, by looking at the matter from two sides, i.e., from the preceding ritualist Vedic literature, on the one hand, and, on the other, from the early literature of movements advocating *ahiṃsā* like the Jains and the Buddhists.

For, even if it is conceded that the origin of *ahiṃsā* as a mode of life may not be found within the ritualist tradition, this tradition may still disclose some information on the motive(s) which gave rise to *ahiṃsā* as a mode of life in a different milieu under different circumstances. From this point of view, I take H.-P. SCHMIDT's 1968: 646-649; 1997: 214) observations in connection with the Vedic occurrences of the word *ahiṃsā* to be still worth serious consideration, and I do not join BODEWITZ 1999: 23ff) in discarding them in the lump. To be sure, there is no real *ahiṃsā* in

⁶ Cf., also for further references, OLIVELLE 1993: 101f; HOUBEN 1999: 130 n. 45; OLIVELLE 1999: xxviii-xxxiv (where ĀpDhS is considered to be the earliest *dharmasūtra*, with its upper limit around the beginning of the third century B.C.).

⁷ Cf. BRONKHORST (1993b: 12; 30; 33), according to whom (ibid.: 17f; 20f) the *parivrajās* are not Vedic ascetics. Bronkhorst's use of the terms "Vedic" and "non-Vedic" is, however, criticized by BODEWITZ (1999: 21 n. 9).

⁸ Cf. HOUBEN 1999: 132, esp. n. 48 (end).

⁹ Cf. METTE 1991: 134ff. Cf. also TÄHTINEN 1976: 132; v. SIMSON 1991: 95.

¹⁰ I.e. unless some sufficiently pertinent passage from what P. HACKER has called anonymous literature, e.g. from the Mbh or from the Jaina canon, could be convincingly proved to stem from a period before the Buddha and Mahāvira.

the middle Vedic sources adduced by SCHMIDT but rather *hiṃsā* ritually camouflaged as *ahiṃsā*. Yet, the various linguistic, ritual and meta-ritual strategies employed, according to these sources, by the ritualists in order to dissociate themselves, somehow or other, from the act of killing or injuring or in order to appease the victim or bring about its apparent consent¹¹ are clear indications of a considerable embarrassment, as HOUBEN (1999: 117ff) puts it. This embarrassment clearly stems from killing, injuring or wounding living beings (including trees and other plants, water, the earth, and exceptionally even artefacts¹²): the ritual manipulations are expressly carried out for the sake of not injuring *these beings*, for in quite a few of SCHMIDT's passages *āhiṃsāyai* is used in an *active* sense,¹³ with an objective genitive designating some creature (or creatures) that might be injured as its complement¹⁴ or in connection with a verbal phrase corresponding to such a construction.¹⁵ The passages adduced by SCHMIDT are mostly from the *Maitrāyaṇī-Saṃhitā* and hence fairly early. In other *Saṃhitās*, we find, in parallel passages, also *ākṛuramkārāya* ("in order not to wound" [sc. the earth]).¹⁶ Even if such expressions are missing in other ritualistic texts,¹⁷ they are sufficient to prove that at least in one strand of Vedic ritualism embarrassment at killing was clearly felt, the more so if "this is part and parcel of sacrificial ideologies everywhere"¹⁸.

On the other hand, the use of *āhiṃsāyai* in a passive sense with the ritualist

¹¹ SCHMIDT 1997: 223.

¹² SCHMIDT 1968: 648 (ŚB 6.5.3.8-9: the fire-pan!).

¹³ SCHMIDT 1968: 647-48.

¹⁴ SCHMIDT 1968: 647 n. 3: *eṣāṃ lokānām āhiṃsāyai*. Cf. MS 3.9.3 (p. 116,3): *imāṃ lokān hiṃsitor*. Therefore, HOUBEN's (1999: 117 n. 19; cf. also 137 n. 58) remark that the 'active' sense of *ahiṃsā* is late is questionable. Even if *āhiṃsāyai* were taken in a passive sense with a subjective genitive (actually there or to be supplied), the latter would anyway *not* be, in these cases, the ritualist himself but some other creature he is conscious, or afraid, of injuring by his activity (cf. the use of *āriṣṭyai* at ŚB 13.4.2.15).

¹⁵ SCHMIDT 1968: 647 n. 1: *maṇaḥ hiṃsīr iti* (MS 3.9.3: p. 115,18); n. 4; 648 n. 6 u. 7. Cf. also ŚB 3.8.5.10 *māpō māṣadhīr hiṃsīr iti*.

¹⁶ TS 5.1.7.1; *Kāthaka-Saṃhitā* (ed. L. v. SCHROEDER, repr. Wiesbaden 1970) 19.7; cf. also MS 3.10.1: *yād evāya ... krūrām ākrāṃs, tād ākrūrām akas ...* (SCHMIDT 1968: 647 n.4).

¹⁷ BODEWITZ 1999: 24.

¹⁸ Ibid.: 24 n. 12 (quoting W. DONIGER & B.K. SMITH, *The Laws of Manu*, New York 1991: XXXI n. 39). Cf. also SCHMIDT 1997: 223.

First in
Vedic texts -
near... and
Bāth S. and
ŚB, also in
Maitrāyaṇī
must be about
500 BC.

What is the
motive for
ahiṃsā?

himself as the patiens is exemplified by only one of SCHMIDT's examples.¹⁹ Even so, there is good reason to assume that at least one facet of the embarrassment born of killing and injuring is *fear*, more precisely the fear that inflicting death or injury upon a living being might entail, somehow, the same or a similar injury to be suffered by the perpetrator (or his offspring, or even his cattle). This is clearly indicated at MS 3.1.8 where the contrivance of a ritualist device to camouflage injury afflicted upon the earth is expressly motivated by the idea that otherwise the ritualist himself would suffer harm.²⁰ As pointed out by SCHMIDT,²¹ the precise nature of this correlation becomes clearer in a few other passages, stating that cattle, or whatever creatures are consumed by man, will eat him, in return, in the *yonder world*, unless they are ritually prevented from doing so. In the famous story of Bhṛgu in the yonder world (ŚB 11.6.1; JB 1.42-44)²² this principle is explicitly applied not only to animals but also to food plants, to trees chopped (for fuel), and (in the ŚB version) even to water.

SCHMIDT (1968: 645), following H. LOMMEL,²³ emphasizes that "this legend is based on the conception of the inverted world where everything is turned into its opposite" and that it "has nothing to do with ethical ideas" or punishment. But he also interprets this reversal in terms of *revenge* taken by the injured creature on the perpetrator. Both conceptions can be documented by ethnological parallels.²⁴ They do not seem to be altogether incompatible. Actually, the wording of the Bhṛgu story in JB suggests the idea of revenge insofar as the former victims retaliating upon their former torturers in the yonder world declare that *they* are now pursuing in return *prātisacāmahai* those who had pursued them on earth. More explicit is a verse from the *Bhāgavata-Purāṇa* referred to in SCHMIDT 1997 (228):

¹⁹ SCHMIDT 1968: 649 n. 1 (MS 1.5.11).

²⁰ See SCHMIDT 1968: 648 with n. 7. Cf. also HOUBEN 1999: 120 with n. 28: the Adhvaryu priest conceals himself from the animals, in order to remain uninjured himself (*ātmāno 'nāvrasakāya*: S 6.3.8.3).

²¹ SCHMIDT 1968: 643-45. Cf. also BODEWITZ 1973: 107 n. 16.

²² Cf. BODEWITZ 1973: 99ff (with further references). Cf. also BHATT 1994: 33f; SCHMITHAUSEN 1995: 481 forthcoming: § 13.4 with n. 94. For a Japanese translation see FUSHIMI 1997.

²³ "Bhṛgu im Jenseits." In: *Paideuma* 4 (1950): 93-109 (= *Kleine Schriften*, ed. K.L. INERT, Stuttgart 1978: 211-227).

²⁴ For the idea of the inverted world see LOMMEL, op.cit.; for the idea, especially in hunter societies, that the victim (unless treated correctly) may take revenge on the killer see, e.g., MEULI 1946: 226ff. 248. ZERRIES 1954: 136-140; 145; 150; 153-157; PAULSON et al. 1962: 175; 288f; 35; DAMMANN 1963: 45. Cf. also n. 34, 116.

Bhāgavata Purāṇa

"The sacrificial victims he had killed mercilessly [now] cut him up with axes, angry, remembering that torture [which] he [had inflicted upon them]."²⁵

And similarly:

"O king, lord of creatures, look, look at the troops of living creatures [up there], the cattle you have mercilessly killed in sacrifice by thousands! They are [now] waiting for you, remembering your cruelty, [and] full of wrath they are going to cut you up with iron horns after your death."²⁶

These verses, to be sure, make use of the concept of retaliation in a specific anti-ritualist context (just as a verse transmitted in the *Mahābhārata* and in the *Manu-smṛiti*²⁷ uses it in a vegetarianist context), but what is important to me here is merely the fact that they quite clearly understand the events happening in the yonder world as an act of *revenge*.²⁸

BODEWITZ (1999: 24) doubts whether there is a close relation between the *hiṃsā* one has committed oneself and the injury one is afraid of. He points out that "there is often no expiation for one's own *hiṃsā*" and that there is no "widespread occurrence of the term *ahiṃsā* in all the Vedic ritualist texts. In some Brāhmaṇas (e.g. JB and ŚāṅkhB) it is even totally missing". But even if there was a strand of Vedic ritualism that was unembarrassed by acts of killing, even of straightforward, bloody killing, and did not share the view that killing living beings tended to be, somehow or other, retaliated upon the killer, and even if this was the more original and mainstream attitude of Vedic ritualism, it can hardly be denied that *some* sources or passages explicitly testify to a *different* attitude. The view unfolded in the Bhṛgu story (and referred to by a couple of further passages) may not be typical for main-

²⁵ BhāgP 4.28.26: *taṃ yajñapaśavo 'nena saṃjñaptā ye 'dayālunā / kuṭhāraiś cicchiduh kruddhāḥ smaranto 'mivam asya tat //*

²⁶ BhāgP 4.25.7-8: *bhoḥ bhoḥ prajāpate rājan, paśūn paśya tvayādhvare / saṃjñāpitān jīvasaṅghān nirghṛṇena sahasraśaḥ // ete tvāṃ sampratīkṣante smaranto vaiśasaṃ tava / samparetam ayahkūṭaiś chindanty utthitamanyavaḥ //*

²⁷ Mbh 13.117.33-34; *Manusmṛiti* 5.55; cf. SCHMIDT 1968: 629; HARA 1998: 3 (=290).

²⁸ We cannot, perhaps, be altogether sure that the BhāgP (well-known for its archaisms but of disputed date, cp. ROCHER 1986: 146-148) was familiar with the Bhṛgu story of ŚB or JB. But in view of the Mbh and *Manusmṛiti* verses referred to in n. 27, some continuity of the idea itself that animals killed retaliate upon the killer in the yonder world is highly probable.

Bhṛgu story

stream Vedic ritualism, but anyway it is clearly documented and thus did exist. The more so if it is considered to be a reflection of a popular view, as suggested by BODEWITZ²⁹. In this case, it must have been more wide-spread outside the ritualist Vedic milieu. It may be difficult to decide where, precisely, the presumable archetype of the Bhṛgu story originated. But in view of its occurrence — in two versions which seem to derive from a common source³⁰ — in the late portion of the *Śatapatha-Brahmaṇa* which is "of Eastern origin"³¹ and in (a younger portion of) the *Jaiminīya-Brahmaṇa* which belongs to a Vedic school located SW of the Gangetic plane ("Eastern border unclear")³², the middle Gangetic plane may be a probable candidate. It would hence be justified to presuppose some familiarity with the world-view of the Bhṛgu story in that area,³³ which, as may be worth noting, would at least overlap with the homelands of Jainism and Buddhism.

As already stated, the idea of the victim taking revenge on the killer is not unknown in ethnological literature; as regards the Indian subcontinent, I found it documented for the Lhota Nagas: "So soll der Hund ... die erschlagenen Feinde und die erlegten Wildtiere aus dem Wege scheuchen, die sich am Toten nun rächen wollen, ..." ³⁴. A related view is that already in *this* world the *congeners* of the victim may attack the killer or, for that matter, the eater³⁵ whom they may recognize by the smell of the meat, as we read in the Pāli *Vinaya*³⁶ where this view is adduced as a reason why monks should abstain from eating the meat of lions, tigers and other animals of

²⁹ 1973: 99, referring to WEBER and EGGELING.

³⁰ BODEWITZ 1973: 102.

³¹ WITZEL 1989: 195. WITZEL 1987: 199f gives Kosala and Videha as the areas of compilation of the portion concerned but also remarks that some of the materials included point to a more Western area than Videha.

³² WITZEL 1989: 115.

³³ The more so if KRICK (1982: 211 n. 529) is right in pointing out that ŚB is characterized by a "Vereinfachung des Rituals, dadurch Umfassen weitester Volksschichten und allgemeine Verbreitung".

³⁴ HÖFER 1975: 50.

³⁵ Vgl. auch ZERRIES 1954: 135 (Jäger, die einen Tapir getötet und sein Fleisch geröstet haben, müssen "das Röstgestell vernichten, damit nicht ein anderer Tapir, der zufällig ... die Überreste des Artgenossen findet, als Vergeltung des Nachts im Schlaf einen der Männer packt und seinerseits ... röstet."); 139 ("... damit ... die Gefährten des Tigers nicht kommen und für ihren Verwandten Rache nehmen.").

³⁶ Vin I 220: *bhikkhū sīhamamsam* (etc.) *paribhuñjivā araṇṇe viharanti. sīhā sīha-mamsa-gandhena bhikkhū paripāṇenti.*

Is the evolution from a traditional conception of animal slaughter to be ethical or not? What would it take for it to be ethical in nature?

prey. This view seems to presuppose that species of animals are regarded like tribes³⁷ whose members would, just as in human tribal society, try to take revenge if one of them is killed.

By the way, SCHMIDT (1997: 214f) also mentions another ŚB passage (3.8.5.8-10) according to which the ritual annulment of killing or injuring living beings ensures that one is delivered from god Varuṇa's noose, which means that Varuṇa would normally punish the killer. This suggests that, for *some* ritualists at least, the embarrassment at killing is not just fear (though fear, in this case of a numinous power, is, to be sure, also involved) but includes at least an inkling that killing and injuring are *wrong in themselves*. I leave it undecided whether this is also indicated by the fact that in the Bhṛgu story the ritual device to escape retaliation is called "expiation" (*prāyaścitti*, *niṣkṛti*) (SCHMIDT 1997: 214); for it may well be that "expiation" evokes connotations not implied in the Sanskrit terms, which may simply mean rites averting evil (SLAJE 1997: 213).

If fear alone is the reason for embarrassment at killing and injuring, it is easily explained why the ritualists do not give up killing; for as long as they are convinced of the effectiveness of ritual devices protecting them from undesired consequences there is no reason for them to desist from killing if killing is involved in purposeful activity, as, e.g., the solemn rites, or (ritual?) slaughter of animals for the sake of meat.³⁸ Even if embarrassment includes a sense of wrong-doing, the socio-economic

³⁷ OLDENBERG 1919: 41: "Reste ... sind von jenem Verhältnis zur Tierwelt übrig, wie es in vorgeschichtlicher Zeit den Jägervölkern eigen war: ... Die verschiedenen Tierarten leben in einer Art Stammes- oder Volksorganisation ... Auch Familie und Verwandtschaft gibt es unter ihnen." Cp. also the fact that in an animal sacrifice "the consent of the parents, brother, and companion of the victim is required (ŚB 3.7.4.5)" (SCHMIDT 1997: 223).

³⁸ SCHMIDT (1997: 209f) discusses the question whether in the ancient Indian society there was any non-ritual slaughter of animals at all. He tends to an answer in the negative (cf. also OBERLIES 1998: 274 n. 600, referring to KRICK 1975: 31 n. 23 and 1982: 94-95 n. 240), but it may be necessary to distinguish between slaughter of (larger?) domestic animals on the one hand and hunting or even fishing on the other, between the Vedic and the post-Vedic situation and of course between the habits of the different strata or strands of society. As far as I can see, there is no indication that the mutton- and pork-butchers (*orabbhika*, *sūkāraka*) mentioned in the Buddhist and Jaina canon (see PTC and CPD s.v. *orabbhika*; Sūy II.2.28 (JĀS § 709)) did their job in a ritual context or that the slaughter-houses (*sūnā*) mentioned in the *Vinaya* (cf. Vin I 202: *sūkara-sūnā*) were places of ritual slaughter, though this does not, of course, exclude the possibility that even in these cases some (however brief) kind of (non-Vedic) ritual preceded or accompanied the killing. By the way, as Albrecht Wezler informs me, even in present-day Nepal we find private ritual slaughter (in the temple or at home) on special occasions side by side with buying meat from 'professional' butchers.

situation may have been such as not to permit full-grown (male) members of the group (family, clan) to abstain from such activities. In this connection, it is interesting that the Bhṛgu story describes various situations of *consumption* (i.e. eating, drinking and using wood for fuel) and, in some instances in the ŚB version, the immediately preceding action of chopping up, whereas killing is not expressly mentioned but either presupposed or perhaps regarded as being implied in the act of chopping up or devouring. This would seem to indicate that eating and killing are felt to be inseparably connected. Another important point is that the Bhṛgu story is not (at least not explicitly) about ritual killing in sacrifice but rather about everyday consumption including the use of fire-wood, meat, vegetables and water (ŚB only). Moreover, the text sees no difference as between animals, plants and (ŚB) water: all of them retaliate upon the consumer. This hardly makes sense unless all of them are taken to be regarded as living, sentient beings who suffer from being killed by consumption (e.g., water) or for consumption (e.g., cattle). Therefore, *all* eating, implying killing and hence pain, is embarrassing and, in view of the retaliation it entails, disastrous. (Since humans cannot, however, survive without food, it is understandable that the ritualist resorts to ritual as a way out of the difficulty, by embedding the whole process of consumption into the agnihotra rite³⁹ which is credited with the capability of preventing retaliation.)

The Bhṛgu story is not of course a document of *ahiṃsā* (not even in the sense of ritually camouflaging *hiṃsā*; it merely teaches a ritual prevention of its undesired consequences). Still, the story is based on a set of beliefs which SCHMIDT was right in considering a possible starting-point, and motivation, for real *ahiṃsā* as soon as the ritualist escape from the dilemma came to be regarded, for whatever reason, as ineffective or inappropriate. This is *not* to claim that this set of beliefs, or the closely related one that injury might be retaliated by the congeners, was of necessity the *only* starting-point. Important aspects of *ahiṃsā* may well have had a quite different original motive. Abstaining from killing stinging *insects*, e.g., often figures, side by side with enduring heat and cold or hunger and thirst, as an example for an ascetic's capability to endure hardship,⁴⁰ i.e. as an element of ascetic austerity (*tapas*), the primary

³⁹ Cf., apart from the Bhṛgu story, also TB 2.1.5.4 and ŚB 2.3.1.11-12 (see BODEWITZ 1976: 166f).

⁴⁰ This motivation is explicit (reference to *tave* = *tapas*) at, e.g., Āyār I.6.3.2 (p. 29, 22-25; cf. also p. 38, 5-12), and obvious at, e.g., Sn 52 or MN I 10, 25-27. It is at least primary at, e.g., Āyār pp. 42, 26f, 40, 13f, 42, 7f and Utt 15.4 (though *ahiṃsā*, i.e. not reacting to the sting or molestation by swatting the insects, may be yet another motive here, as is clear from Utt 2.12-13 (§

purpose of which is often not so much *ahiṃsā* as the accumulation of supranormal power or attainment of some boon, or the burning up of defilements.⁴¹ Yet, the aim of my present paper is not to be exhaustive but to establish, based, to a certain extent, on SCHMIDT's approach, at least one strand, and perhaps the most important one, of the motivation which led to the practice and attitude of *ahiṃsā*. For the recognition of this strand, the views on living beings and afterlife expressed or reflected in the Bhṛgu story are of utmost importance. For, if one discards the ritualist solution of the problem but keeps to the idea that not only animals but also plants and seeds and perhaps even water are living, sentient beings who mind being killed or injured, and to the idea that killing or injuring them will be retaliated in the yonder world,⁴² the logical consequence would be that the only safe way is not to kill or injure anything, i.e. complete *ahiṃsā*.

In the Bhṛgu story it is only in the context of consumption/food that the dilemma is elaborated, but it is obvious that the same difficulty obtains also in other situations, e.g. averting dangerous animals or troublesome insects, or eradicating weeds. Yet, consumption — eating and drinking and, for that matter, cooking — is doubtless the most crucial issue. (If everything, or almost everything, to be consumed is alive and hence has to be killed for consumption (or is killed by consumption), the only way to avoid killing appears to be voluntary starvation.) As is well-known, this is actually what some Jainas and some ascetics referred to in the Hindu Dharmasūtras⁴³ finally do. There was, however, another, somewhat less consistent but more practicable solution, viz. to dissociate consumption from killing. This was achieved either by restricting one's diet to non-vital or fallen parts of plants⁴⁴ or the remnants of the

60-61)).

⁴¹ Cf., e.g., RÜPING 1977; HARA 1979: 191-360 and 511-515; 1997-98: 638-640; SHEP 1986: 190f; 195ff; 346ff.

⁴² The situation changes, of course, considerably as soon as one or the other of these ideological presuppositions is abandoned or rejected. As is well known, according to the canonical texts of both Buddhists and Jainas (cf. FRAUWALLNER 1956: 295ff; Sūy I.1.1.11-13; II.1.15-24 (cf. BOLLÉE 1977: 64ff; 139ff; 152ff)) some teachers of the age discarded the idea of a yonder world and of retribution for one's deeds and are denounced as sanctioning any amount of killing (and may, in fact, have dissuaded people from having scruples about killing for food, or in war). On the tendency of Buddhism to narrow down the range of sentient beings to animals see below (p. 270).

⁴³ ĀpDhS 2.(9.)22.4 and 23.2; BauDhS 3.3.14 (on which see WEZLER 1991: 218 n. 8); cf. BRONKHORST 1993a: 50-53; 1993b: 15; OLIVELLE 1993: 114. Cf. also Mbh 13, App. I, 1085-89.

⁴⁴ ĀpDhS 2.(9.)22.2-3 and 23.2; BauDhS 2.(6.)11.15; GauDhS (1.)3.25 (BÜHLER: 3.26). This diet may, however, also (and perhaps primarily) be motivated by ascetic considerations (cf. DN

The ritual
doesn't work?

some
solution -
dissociate
consumption from
killing.

The ritualist
escape from
dilemma

Asceticism
as a kind of
hardship.

quarry of beasts of prey (*baiṣka*, *vighasa*),⁴⁵ or by living on alms-food. The latter solution, also an element of the life-style of the Veda student (*brahmacārīn*),⁴⁶ was, as is well-known, adopted by wandering ascetics of different affiliation, including those described in the Dharmasūtras⁴⁷ as well as Jaina and Buddhist monks (and nuns). Needless to say that even this way out was open only to a minority depending as they did on householders or lay adherents for their subsistence.⁴⁸ Moreover, this solution normally implies that the killing is done by the householders, though at least the Jaina monks try to make sure that they get only remnants and that no food is procured or prepared especially for them.⁴⁹ Anyway, according to this pattern, householders cannot really come up to the ideal of *ahiṃsā*.⁵⁰ Yet, at the time of early Jainism and Buddhism the socio-economic situation had come to differ considerably from the earlier Vedic one in that semi-nomadic economy centered around livestock had gradually changed into a sedentary, predominantly agricultural mode of life, eventually resulting in urbanization.⁵¹ As far as supply of meat is concerned, there were now, as can be gleaned from the Pāli canon, specialists for butchering sheep, pigs or cows, etc.⁵² Thus, at least in the cities there was a further degree of dissociation of eating from killing, and many lay people, too, could avoid killing at least in the case of animals, without having to give up meat-eating.

Is the motive for *ahiṃsā*, or abstention from killing living beings, in the early sources of those movements fear of retaliation?

But is the fear of retaliation in the yonder world actually found as a motive for *ahiṃsā*, or abstention from killing living beings, in the early sources of those movements?

I 166,23f). For the Jains, even eating fallen fruits would still entail killing living beings since they have their own souls (SCHUBRING 1935: 134; DELEU 1970: 260).

⁴⁵ BauDhS 2.(6).11.15; 3.3.6; GauDhS (1.)3.30 (BÜHLER: 3.31); cf. WEZLER 1978: 99f.

⁴⁶ Cf., e.g., *Pāraskara-Gṛhyasūtra* (ed. M.G. BÄKRE, Bombay 1982) 2.5.1ff (p. 211); ĀpDhS 1.(1.)3.25ff.

⁴⁷ GauDhS (1.)3.10 and 13 (BÜHLER 3.11 and 14); BauDhS 2.(6).11.22; cf. ĀpDhS 2.(9.)21.10.

⁴⁸ The existence of larger groups of ascetics and renunciants living on alms-food would seem to presuppose a considerable economic surplus, which may have become available only in connection with the socio-economic changes at the end of the Vedic period. Cf. ERDOSY 1988: 108; GOMBRICH 1988: 52f; v. SIMSON 1991: 91f; 99; OLIVELLE 1993: 55ff.

⁴⁹ ALSDORF 1962: 571 (= 1998: 845).

⁵⁰ Sn 393. Cf. CAILLAT 1989-90: 38: "... la vie laïque est invariablement agressive ...".

⁵¹ Cf. GOMBRICH 1988: 35; 38; 50-55; for urbanisation, cf. also, e.g., ERDOSY 1988, esp. 106ff; HARTEL 1991; v. SIMSON 1991.

⁵² Cf., e.g., MN I 58,1f (*go-ghātaka*); 343,22ff (*orabbhika*, *sūkarika*, etc.); cf. also n. 38).

ments which propagate *ahiṃsā* as an element of their mode of life, and is it the *only* motive or not? And are there any indications of connection with the view expressed in the Bhṛgu story? In this paper, I am unable to answer these questions on the basis of an exhaustive analysis of Jaina, Buddhist and Hindu sources. All I can do is to present a preliminary answer based on selected passages, mainly from Jaina and Buddhist texts.

One of the most famous passages emphasizing universal *ahiṃsā* is the first chapter of the *Āyāraṅga* (sc. *Sattha-parinnā*).⁵³ It starts by distinguishing between those who do not know and those who know that they have a Self (*āyā* = *ātman*) that is the subject of transmigration; it is important to accept the existence of such a Self and to understand that its moving through all kinds of (mostly disagreeable) existences is due to one's actions, especially acts of violence or killing⁵⁴ directed against animals, plants or the elements.⁵⁵ The sage, the Jain ascetic, must become aware of the totality of detrimental acts and desist from them. The predominant motive seems to be disgust with or even dismay at the ubiquity of pain and suffering in this world where beings, though unhappy themselves, torture one another, not knowing that thereby they perpetuate their own misfortune because their violent acts entail, after death, rebirth in forms of existence the vast majority of which is undesirable:

Disgust at suffering.

"The [living] world is afflicted, miserable, difficult to instruct and without discrimination. In this world full of pain, look, everywhere, variously (?), [beings, though] suffering [themselves,] make others suffer. ... When someone ... injures living beings, ... this will entail misfortune for him."⁵⁶

But it is not only disgust with the vicissitudes and sufferings of *saṃsāra* that makes ascetics desist from killing and other acts of violence but also *embarrassment*: "Look, [there are others,] different [from common people] (?), who feel ashamed"

⁵³ On this passage and the problems involved, see also ARAMAKI 1993: 58-60 and 85-88.

⁵⁴ Regardless of whether one commits them personally, makes others commit them, or approves of their committing them: Āyār p. 2,13-15.

⁵⁵ In the case of the elements, there is, however, a certain ambiguity whether the "weapon" is directed towards them or, rather, consists in them. Cf. SCHUBRING's remarks on the text (see Āyār p. 57f).

⁵⁶ Āyār p. 2,3-15: *aṭṭe loe pariṇṇe dussaṃbohe avijāṇae. assim loe pavvahie tattha-tattha puḍho pāsa āurā pariāventi ... jam inam ... pāne vihiṃsai, tam se ahiyāe*. Transl. based on JACOBI 1884 and SCHUBRING 1926, with modifications.

(*lajjamānā puḍho pāsa*). On the other hand, in this passage the concept of "Self" or soul (*āyā/ātman*) seems to contribute only indirectly to the resolve to desist from killing or violence, viz. because it guarantees that there is afterlife and, hence, no escape from retribution for one's evil actions.⁵⁷

Horror of perpetuating mutual killing in the world would seem to be the motive for *ahiṃsā* also at Āyār I.6.1.2-4 (p. 27,9ff). After having pointed out various aspects of suffering befalling creatures in *saṃsāra* the text states:

"Living beings torment living beings! See, [this is] the great danger in [this] world! Creatures are indeed exposed to many sufferings! ... [Though themselves] afflicted, they may torment [others] ... Look, o sage, this is the great danger! [Therefore] one should not kill any [living being]."⁵⁸

Another instance is Āyār I.3.2.3 (p. 15,12-17):

"It is clear (*hi*), therefore, that the hero, having desisted from killing, will cut off sorrow, moving towards becoming light (i.e. rising to the place of the liberated souls at the top of the world). ... Having got [the chance of] emerging [from the torrent of lower births into an existence] among humans, he should not take the lives of living creatures [and thereby waste this unique opportunity to escape from the awful circle of rebirth]."⁵⁹

Here too desisting from killing is motivated by the wish to avoid its evil consequences consisting in reiterated rebirth and the sufferings entailed thereby, and to attain final emancipation.

As a last example of this kind of motivation from the *Āyāraṅga*, let me adduce Āyār I.9.1.11-15. Here, Mahāvīra's own motivation for *ahiṃsā* is touched upon. First, he realizes the precise extension of life and sentience, covering not only plants and seeds but also mould and the minute elementary beings. Then, he decides to avoid injuring any of them, realizing that living beings may, each in its own terms,

⁵⁷ Cf., in this connection, the anomism of the deniers of a transmigrating Self or soul at Sūy 2.1.15-17 and 21-24; cf. BOLLÉE 1977: 139f and 152f.

⁵⁸ Āyār p. 27,28ff: *pāṇā pāṇe kilesanti: pāsa loe mahab-bhayaṃ. bahu-dukkhā hu jantavo ... āurā pariyāvae. ... eyaṃ pāsa, muñi, mahab-bhayaṃ, nāivāeja kaṃcaṇaṃ.*

⁵⁹ *tamhā hi vīre virao vahāno chindejja soyaṃ lahubhūya-gāmī. ... ummuggā laddhuṃ iha mānavehiṃ no pāṇiṇaṃ pāṇē samārabhejjā[si].* For parallels to the last pāda see CAILLAT 1993: 220f; for an alternative syntactical interpretation see Jā I 168,7: *na pāṇo pāṇiṇaṃ hañhe*.

be placed by their respective karma in any form of rebirth: stationary beings may become mobile beings, and mobile stationary. Thus he completely understands karma and its disastrous consequences ("The unwise, with his [karmic] loads,⁶⁰ will perish": *sovahe hu luppai bāle*), and therefore desists from evil actions. Here, too, the primary motive for *ahiṃsā* seems to be the wish to avoid the undesired effect of killing and injuring living beings which may drive the actor even into a stationary form of rebirth. But what may be of special interest in connection with the Bhṛgu story is the express reference here to a mutual transition of the basic categories of stationary and mobile living beings. I cannot but be reminded of the exchange of rôles of humans and their victims (including plants, i.e. stationary beings) in the yonder world. To be sure, in the Jaina world view, retaliation is not normally conceived of in terms of individual revenge of the victim on the killer but rather in terms of impersonal karmic retribution, but on an impersonal level the reversal of the relation of actor and victim, of food and eater seems to be preserved. >

A straightforward motivation of *ahiṃsā* by referring to the undesired karmic consequences of injuring or killing living beings is found in the *Dasaveyāliya*:

"He (i.e., obviously, a monk) who hurts living beings while walking (etc.), binds evil karma; this will entail a bitter reward for him."⁶¹

"Self-controlled ... [monks] do not injure the earth (/water /plants /animals) in thought, word or deed ... He who injures the earth (i.e. earth living beings), injures, for sure (*u*), also (*ya*) manifold [minute] mobile living beings (i.e. animals) that live in or on it (/them): those one can see and those one cannot see. Therefore, knowing that this is wrongdoing promoting evil rebirth (*duggaṃ*), one should avoid doing violence to the earth during the whole course of [one's] life."⁶²

Many more details about what awaits wrongdoers in afterlife are furnished in *Sūyagada* I 5th describing the tortures inflicted upon them in the *hells*. Most of the

⁶⁰ I take *muḍhi* in the sense of *kammovadhi* = *kamma-pariggaha*: cp. CPD s.v. *upadhi*.

⁶¹ *Dasav* 4 verse 1, etc.: *ajayaṃ caramāṇo u pāṇa-bhūyāi hiṃsai / bandhai pāvakaṃ kammam, tam se haṃ kassam phalaṃ //*

⁶² *Dasav* 6 27-29 *puḍhaviḍḍayaṃ na hiṃsanti maṇasā vayasā kāyasā / ... samjayaṃ ... // puḍhaviḍḍayaṃ hiṃsanti hiṃsai u tayassiye / tase ya vivihe pāṇe cakkhuse ya acakkhuse // tamhā eyaṃ viyānita dhamma dukkha-vaddhaṇaṃ / puḍhaviḍḍaya-samārambhaṃ jāvajjivāe vajjae //*; cf. 30-32 and 41-46.

⁶³ Cf. *Dasav* I 10 9 (§481).

persons who are subjected to the tortures of hell are such as have indulged in vehement and cruel killing (5.1.4-5),⁶⁴ and at the end (5.2.24) the text explicitly states that a wise person who hears of these hells will thereby be motivated not to injure or kill any [living being] in the world. Apart from being primarily concerned with what happens in the yonder world to persons who have killed living beings, there are several features that cannot but remind one of the Bhṛgu story. One is that the tortures are carried out by torturers quite similar to the human-shaped creatures who in the Bhṛgu story chop and devour in return the deceased who had chopped and devoured them in this world. To be sure, in the *Sūyagaḍa* the torturers are not, as far as I can see, explicitly identified with the beings that were the victims in the former life, but at one point (5.2.19) they are called "former enemies" (*puvva-m-arī*),⁶⁵ and at another it is said that they "remind, by [similar] punishments, [their victims] of all the wrongdoing they had committed in a former life."⁶⁶ To supply, with JACOBI (1895: 281), the word "similar" is justified by 5.1.26⁶⁷ and especially 5.2.23 where it is explicitly stated that "one undergoes, in a future life, precisely the same [torture] one has formerly inflicted [on others]."⁶⁸ Actually, many of the tortures described are similar to what human beings do to animals (e.g., 5.1.15; 5.2.2-3; 15-16) or, in a few cases, perhaps trees (5.1.14; 5.2.14) and seeds or juicy plants (5.2.19), and at a few points this is even explicitly stated, e.g.: "They lie there, being roasted, like fish put on the fire alive,"⁶⁹ or: "The [punishers] torture them with sharp pikes as [people do with] a captured dangerous wild animal (< *śvāpada(ka)*?; JACOBI: pig, i.e. *soariya*?)."⁷⁰ Occasionally (5.2.7 and 9) the beings reborn in hell are said to be devoured by animals.

There may be plenty of similar material in the *ahimsā* strand of the Hindu tra-

⁶⁴ It is only in verse 5.1.4c that persons who have taken what was not given to them (*adatta-hārī*) are also mentioned.

⁶⁵ Cf. Śīlāṅka (SūyT p. 93: *janmāntaravairiṇa(h)*), who however hesitates between taking this as a metaphor or literally.

⁶⁶ Sūy 5.1.19: *daṇḍehī ... sarayaṃti ... savvehī daṇḍehī purākaehim*.

⁶⁷ "His burden (i.e. the punishment inflicted upon him) corresponds to what he has done" (*jahā kaḍe kammē tahā si bhāre*).

⁶⁸ *jaṃ jārisaṃ puvvaṃ akāsi kammaṃ, tah' (ed. in SūyT p. 94: tam) eva āgacchati saṃparāye*.

⁶⁹ Sūy 5.1.13: *te tattha ciṭṭhant' abhitappamāṇā macchā va jīvanti uvajotipattā*.

⁷⁰ Sūy 5.2.10: *tikkhāhī sūlāhī bhitāvayaṃti, vasovagaṃ sāvayaṃ (JĀS-ed.: soariyaṃ, with further variants) va laddhuṃ*. Cf. CAILLAT 1993: 214.

dition (cf. also n. 27), but I must confine myself to supplement the above-quoted passages from the *Bhāgavata-Purāṇa* by referring to a couple of others from the same text. Here, in a description of hells, people who have killed animals or tortured them to death are in several cases stated to undergo, in hell, precisely the same treatment in return. In some cases, the punishment is stated to be carried out by Yama's servants.⁷¹ In others, however, it is, just as in the Bhṛgu story, the former victims (or at least also the former victims)⁷² who take revenge upon the wrongdoer. Thus, at BhāgP 5.26.11⁷³ it is stated that just as someone injured creatures in this world, in precisely the same way will these injure him in the Raurava hell after having become Rurus, which are not, of course, innocuous deer⁷⁴ here but, as the text makes clear, a certain kind of carnivorous beings more cruel than snakes. According to 5.26.17,⁷⁵ a person who in this life malevolently injures (or kills) creatures [like mosquitoes, lice, bugs, flies] for which God has arranged [to live on a certain] diet (e.g. human blood) and which are not conscious of tormenting others, will in the yonder world on account of his/her enmity towards these creatures, fall into the 'deep well [hell] where these creatures will attack him in their turn.'⁷⁶

Even in Buddhist literature, sporadic traces of the earlier view of the victim taking revenge on the killer can be found. The *Samyuttanikāya* includes a set of

⁷¹ E.g. BhāgP 5.26.13 and 24 (in the latter passage, only slaughter outside the ritual (*atīrthe* and hunting committed by Aryans is stated to be punished in hell!).

⁷² As at BhāgP 5.26.32, where we are told that persons who have caught and tortured animals (obviously including birds) will, after death, suffer the same torture in hell and be pecked by (those?) birds, so that they remember their misdeed (!).

⁷³ *ye tv iha yathāhvāmūṇā vihiṃsitā jantavaḥ, paratra Yama-yātanam upagataṃ (v.1) 'yātanāyatanam upagatās' ta eva ruravo bhūtvā tathā tam eva vihiṃsanti; tasmād rauravam it' āhu(h); rurur iti sarpaḍ atikrūra-sattvasyāpadeśaḥ*. Cf. BODEWITZ 1973: 107 n. 16, referring to L. SCHERMAN, *Materialien zur Geschichte der Indischen Visionsliteratur*, Leipzig 1892: 6 n. 2.

⁷⁴ Cervus duvauceli nach Renate SYED, "Zur Bedeutung des *kṛṣṇasāra* (Antilope cervicapra und des *ruru* (Cervus duvauceli) im Alten Indien", in: *Beiträge des Südasien-Instituts* (Humboldt Universität zu Berlin) 2/1992: 93-156, esp. 117ff.

⁷⁵ *yas tv iha vai bhūtānām īśvarōpakalpita-vṛttinām avikta-para-vyathānām ... vyathānā ācarati, sa paratrāndhakūpe tad-abhidroheṇa nīpatati; tatra hāsau tair jantubhiḥ ... maśaka-yūkā matkuṇa-makṣikādibhir — ye kecābhidrugdhās, taiḥ — sarvato 'bhidruhyamāṇas tamasi .. parikrāmati*.

⁷⁶ At 5.26.31, it is human beings killed in sacrifice (*puruṣamedha*) who are stated to take revenge on the killers and their wives (if the latter joined in eating human flesh) in Yama's realm in the form of Rākṣasas who chop them up like butchers and drink their blood.

But recognition of the moral law... into even a 12 If not, why not? But that's very anthropocentric - morality does not exist on its own.

suttantas⁷⁷ in each of which a monk relates to have witnessed a curious apparition, the karmic background of which is then explained by the Buddha. In some cases, the apparition is a deformed human being flying through the air, and it is chased and attacked by carnivorous birds. Some of the apparitions are declared to have been 'professional' killers of animals in their previous human existence. It is only in these cases that their being chased and attacked by aggressive birds makes some sense since one could interpret it as a residue of the old idea of the animal victims retaliating upon the killer. But why *birds* in the case of a beef-, mutton- or pork-butcher, and not only in the case of the fowler (*sākuṇika*)? Perhaps because only birds of prey are able to hunt an apparition flying in the air. Thus, it is, to be sure, no longer the very animal killed that takes revenge on the killer (or punishes him) nor even the congeners, but at any rate it is still *animals*.

Somewhat different are cases in which a person who has killed an animal is reborn as precisely the same kind of animal and suffers a similar death, e.g. when a Brahmin who had sacrificed a ram is (several times) reborn as a ram that is, in its turn, sacrificed by a Brahmin.⁷⁸ Since the Brahmin is not, however, identified with the former ram, one might speak of depersonalized retaliation.

Apart from such special cases, the Buddhist canon contains a considerable number of sermons dissuading people from killing living beings (*pāṇātipāta*)⁷⁹ by pointing out its evil consequences in the afterlife or even in this life. Occasionally, the formulation still reminds one, vaguely, of the idea of revenge. Thus, at AN III 205⁸⁰ we read that a person who kills living beings incurs danger and enmity either in his life or in a future state (after death). And AN IV 246⁸¹ expresses the complementary idea that deliberate (and perhaps expressly declared) abstention from killing means offering, to innumerable living beings, the gift of not being a danger to them,

⁷⁷ SN 19.1-21 = II 254-262, corresp. to Vin III 104-107; cf. T vol. 2: 135a-139a.

⁷⁸ Jā I 166f. For further materials, see SCHMITHAUSEN & MAITHRIMURTHI 1998: 206.

⁷⁹ In this connection, derivations of the roots *hims* and *heth* (with or without the prefix *vi-*) are less frequently used. A careful investigation of the shades of meaning, stylistic peculiarities and distribution of "words for violence" in the Buddhist canon on the model of CAILLAT 1993 should be rewarding.

⁸⁰ ... *pāṇātipāta-paccayā ditṭhadhammikam pi bhayaṃ veram pasavati, samparāyikam pi iyaṃ veram pasavati*. Similarly SN II 68,17f.

⁸¹ *Pāṇātipātā paṭivirato ... ariyasāvako aparimāṇānaṃ sattānaṃ abhayaṃ deti averaṃ deti yāpajjhaṃ deti; aparimāṇānaṃ sattānaṃ abhayaṃ ... datvā aparimāṇassa abhayaṃ averassa yāpajjhassa bhāgī hoti*. Cf. also AN I 192f.

It is just a documentation of the history of the idea...

He's assuming the part of the Schlegel - have vice position!

of not being their enemy and of not injuring them, and entails that one receives [from them] the same gift [in return]. This application of *ahiṃsā* — or, for that matter, friendliness (*mettā*)⁸² — as a preventive method to avoid being attacked is, to be sure, suitable for ascetics and renunciators (especially such as were living in the wilderness inhabited by all kinds of potentially dangerous animals), as is well attested in Hindu sources.⁸³ But the passages from Buddhist sources just adduced are concerned with lay people, in connection with whom the undesired consequences⁸⁴ of evil deeds one may incur in this life are, in other passages, described in terms of punishment by the king or social disreputation,⁸⁵ and those incurred after death as evil rebirth,⁸⁶ often specified as falling into hell⁸⁷ or, less frequently, as being reborn as an animal⁸⁸. Still more frequent than dissuading lay people from killing living beings by pointing out its evil effects after death is stimulating them to deliberate abstention from killing by

⁸² SCHMITHAUSEN 1997, esp. 31f. HARA 2000, esp. 15-29 and 46f. For the preventive function of *maitrī* in the epic cf. STRAUSS 1912: 276f.

⁸³ Cf., e.g., STRAUSS 1911: 271f; ALSDORF 1962: 590 with fn. 2; SPROCKHOFF 1994: 77-80. I am not sure that "giving *abhaya*" implies, by necessity, that the giver is already free from fear beforehand, as SPROCKHOFF (78) seems to suggest. *Bhaya* may mean "fear" as well as "cause for fear", "danger" (cf., e.g., Sn 1033: *dukkham assa mahabbhayaṃ*, where "fear" does not make sense). In my view, *abhaya-dāna* is better understood as the gift of (definitely) not being a danger, or cause of fear, to others, which implies fearlessness for them, and entails fearlessness for the giver because the others are expected, or even bound, to grant him, in their turn, the same gift of not being a cause of fear for him. As is also indicated by SPROCKHOFF (80), "giving *abhaya*" leads to attaining *abhaya* both in this life (e.g. BauDhS 2.[10.]17.30: *abhayaṃ sarva-bhūtebhyo datvā yaś carate munih / na tasya sarva-bhūtebhyo bhayaṃ cāpi jāyate //*) and after death (e.g. Mbh 12.154.26: ... *bhūtānām abhayaṃ yataḥ / tasya dehād vimuktasya bhayaṃ nāsti kutaścana //*).

⁸⁴ More precisely: the external evil consequences. I disregard, in the present context, internal effects like feeling uneasy (out of fear or shame) which are mentioned along with the external ones at MN III 163f (cf. also AN III 205,11).

⁸⁵ E.g., MN III 163f; AN I 47. At least punishment by the king may be negligible in the case of killing animals (cp. AN III 208,27-209,6, where only killing a man or a woman is mentioned). Social disreputation may, to be sure, hold good in the case of 'professional' killers of larger animals but hardly in the case of ritual killing. As far as animals are concerned, the motive for *ahiṃsā* is not likely to be found in purely human social concerns but rather trace of a more archaic world-view in which natural beings, and particularly animals, were much more part of man's 'social' ambience and less categorically distinguished from humans.

⁸⁶ E.g., MN I 286f; 313f; II 86; III 203f (here, *pāṇātipātā* and *viheṭhana-jātiko* are clearly distinguished); SN IV 312f; AN I 297; II 83; 253.

⁸⁷ AN II 71,1-6, etc. (see PTC III: 246r, line 25f); with detailed exposition of tortures in hell: MN III 163-167; supervised by Yama: MN III 179-182; AN I 138-140 (cf. Varuṇa in ŚB: see above (p. 7)).

⁸⁸ E.g. MN I 387-389; III 167-169; AN V 289.

holding out to them a prospect of fortunate afterlife, especially rebirth in heaven.⁸⁹ This would seem to be (one of) the Buddhist alternative(s) for what in ritualist Vedic religion is achieved by means of sacrifices. Since in Buddhism there is a tendency to disregard plants (not to mention the elements) in this context and to restrict karmically relevant killing to intentional or at least conscious killing, abstention from killing is, even for many lay people, no longer something altogether impracticable.⁹⁰

To be sure, in Buddhism, too, just as in Jainism, abstaining from killing living beings is also a basic element of the path to final liberation (which is, in the first place, devised for monks and nuns). But the connection between giving up killing on the one hand and liberation from rebirth on the other is a less direct one in Buddhism. It is not primarily actions (and especially evil actions like killing living beings) that are responsible for one's remaining bound in *samsāra* but rather internal energies, especially desire ("thirst": *trṣṇā*), or greed (*lobha*), hatred (*dosa/dveṣa*) and disorientation (*moha*), from which evil actions like killing living beings are said to derive.⁹¹ Hence, in connection with the path to liberation it is not the undesired or awful consequences killing entails in the afterlife that are referred to in order to motivate a person to abstain from killing (nor the heavenly rewards to be attained by abstention from killing, since the person who seeks final liberation is no longer interested in them). Rather, the important point in the soteriological context seems to be that killing living beings is an expression of cruelty,⁹² whereas a monk abstains from killing any creature in an attitude of concern or merciful sympathy (*dayā*) and

⁸⁹ MN I 287f; 314f; II 87; III 203f; SN IV 313f; AN I 211-15 (§§ 9 and 18-24); 297; II 83; 253; IV 251-55 (§§ 2 and 5-10; 254,17 and 255,8-11).

⁹⁰ In Jainism, there is little material on lay ethics in the so-called seniors of the canon. I do not know whether later on deliberate abstention from at least gross injury (*sthūlā hiṃsā*) that is expected from lay followers has, apart from avoiding evil karma and hence evil rebirth, also a positive effect like rebirth in heaven, as, e.g., meritorious activities like generous giving to Jaina ascetics or for religious purposes have (vgl. NORMAN 1993: 175-184). For Hindu sources, see, e.g., Mbh 13.132.9 (... *tyakta-hiṃsā-samācārās te narāḥ svarga-gāminah*); 30; 48-58 (48a+50b: *vṛṇātipātī ... nirayaṃ pratipadyate*; 51ab: *nirayaṃ yāti hiṃsātmā, yāti svargam ahimsakah*); 33.32-42.

⁹¹ E.g., AN I 189f; 194; II 191. These internal factors are by no means ignored in the early Jaina sources: still, the position of karma in early Jaina soteriology is doubtless much more central than in early Buddhism.

⁹² MN I 286,14-16; AN V 264,12f: *idha ... ekacco pāṇātipātī hoti luddo ... adayāpanno vānabhūtesu*. I refrain from referring, here and in the following notes, to parallels from Chinese and Sanskrit sources because I intend to deal with this material in a separate study.

caring (*anukampā*) for all living beings.⁹³ This attitude is, then, also recommended, as an ideal, to pious lay persons even if they still aspire, in the first place, to rebirth in heaven.⁹⁴ The motivation that expresses itself in these terms appears to be quite different from that on which reference to evil consequences in afterlife is based. It is not fear but *empathy*, i.e. the capacity of participating in another's feeling, or, more concretely, *being aware of the fact that others dislike pain and death just as oneself*, and being ready to treat them accordingly.

It is precisely this attitude of empathy that is, as is well-known, in canonical as well as later Buddhist texts,⁹⁵ occasionally modeled into the explicit form of the *Golden Rule* in order to motivate people to desist from killing, thus in a presumably fairly old⁹⁶ verse text in the *Suttanipāta*, immediately after it had been stated that a monk should not be opposed nor attached to living creatures, both moving and stationary⁹⁷:

"As I [am], so [are] these; as [are] these, so [am] I.' Making himself [the standard of] comparison, he should not kill or cause to kill."⁹⁸

Similarly in the *Dhammapada*:⁹⁹

"All [beings] are afraid of violence, all fear death. Making himself [the standard of] comparison, he should not kill or cause to kill. All [beings]

⁹³ E.g. DN I 4,1-3; 63,19-22; MN I 179,22-25; 267,34-37; AN II 208,33-36; V 204,26-30. Cf. also DN II 28,38ff where *avihiṃsā* (*vihiṃsā* probably including here all forms of injuring, not merely killing: cf. MN III 203f) as a virtue of ascetics (*pabbajita*) is immediately followed by *bhūṭānukampā*. For the meaning of the terms *dayā* and *anukampā* see MAITHRIMURTHI 1999: 118-125.

⁹⁴ Cf. the 10 *kusalā kammapathā* (MN I 287,27-29; AN V 266,22-24, etc.); similarly, in the context of exceptional piety during the *uposatha* days (AN I 211,17-24; IV 249,1-9, etc.).

⁹⁵ Cf. SCHMITHAUSEN 1991a: §§ 8.1 and 39.2 (with ns. 17 and 172); cf. also *Jātakamālā* 25.26.

⁹⁶ In view of the subject of the sutta mentioned in the beginning (the *vatthu-gāthā* apart) and at the end (*moneyya*: 700-01, *mona*: 723; cf. also 716 and 718), I have little doubt that this text, a parallel to which is found in the *Mahāvastu* (ed. É. SENART, III 386-89), corresponds to the *Moneyasūte* mentioned in Aśoka's Bairāt (Bhābrā) edict.

⁹⁷ I.e., according to this passage the attitude of detachedness and impartiality is to be cultivated with regard not only to human beings and animals but also plants; cf. SCHMITHAUSEN 1991b: §§ 20.2-21.3 and 24.2.1.

⁹⁸ Sn 705: *yathā ahaṃ tathā ete yathā ete tathā ahaṃ / attānaṃ upamaṃ katvā na haneyya na ghātaye* //. Transl. after NORMAN 1992: 80, slightly changed.

⁹⁹ Verses 129-130 (cf. Uv 5.19; PDhp verse 203): *sabbe tasanti daṇḍassa, sabbe bhāyanti maccuno / attānaṃ ... // sabbe tasanti daṇḍassa, sabbesaṃ jīvitaṃ piyaṃ / attānaṃ ... //*

are afraid of violence, all are fond of life. Making himself [the standard of] comparison, he should not kill or cause to kill."

In a prose *suttanta* of the *Samyuttanikāya*, we even find the the premise of the Golden Rule extended so as to include not only what is undesirable but also what is *desirable* to both oneself and others,¹⁰⁰ although the *conclusion* remains confined to what one should *not* do:

"I for one want to live and not to die, I want happiness and dislike pain. Since I want to live, etc., it would not be agreeable and pleasant to me if somebody were to take my life. Again, for another person, too, it would be disagreeable and unpleasant if I were to take his life, since he [too] wants to live, etc. Precisely that which is disagreeable and unpleasant to me is disagreeable and unpleasant also to the other. How then could I inflict upon the other that which is disagreeable and unpleasant to myself!"¹⁰¹

The fact that the first two examples are from early Buddhist verse texts suggests that this definitely ethical motivation of abstention from killing or of *ahiṃsā* (cf. *Udāna* 5.1) may already belong to the stock of attitudes and ideas Buddhism inherited from an earlier strand of the ascetic movement. Indeed, in Jainism, too, we do find, and not infrequently at that, the same motivation of *ahiṃsā* by the Golden Rule as well as the term "concern" (*dayā*). Though in the so-called "seniors" of the Jaina canon complete explicit formulations seem to be rare, the constituent elements ([a] assumption of a similarity of feeling or reaction in all living beings [b] in analogy to oneself, and [c] ethical consequence) are often found. To present just a few examples:

"We however (i.e. in contradistinction to other teachers who assert that all living beings may be ... killed) declare thus 'All living beings ... should not be struck, not be commanded, nor crushed, nor tormented,

¹⁰⁰ This portion is, however, not represented in the Chinese version (T vol. 2: 273b15-17): "If somebody were about to kill me, I should not be pleased. If [this is something] I am not pleased with, for others, too, it [would be] the same. How then could I kill them!"

¹⁰¹ SN V 353,29ff: *ahaṃ kho 'smi jīvitukāmo amaritukāmo sukhakāmo dukkhapaṭikkūlo / yo cho maṃ jīvitukāmaṃ ... jīvitā voropeyya, na me taṃ assa piyaṃ manāpaṃ / ahaṃ c'eva kho pana param jīvitukāmaṃ ... jīvitā voropeyyaṃ, parassa pi taṃ assa appiyaṃ amanāpaṃ / yo kho my-āyaṃ dhammo appiyo amanāpo, parassa p' eso dhammo appiyo amanāpo / yo my-āyaṃ dhammo appiyo amanāpo, kath' āhaṃ param tena saṃyojayeyyaṃ.*

Is the Golden Rule ethical?

nor slain.¹⁰² ... This is what the Noble ones say.' ... We will ask [the other teachers] severally: 'You debaters, is pain pleasant to you or unpleasant?', and if he has well understood [this matter], he will answer: 'For all living beings ..., pain is unpleasant, ... a great [cause of] fear'.¹⁰³ ... So?

Whereas the preceding quotation contains all constituent elements of the Golden Rule (though not in a fully explicit logical sequence), at *Āyār* I.2.3.4 (p. 8,23-26) we find, to be sure, a clear statement that all living beings are fond of pleasure and want to live but dislike pain and being killed (i.e. [a]), but no attempt to derive, from this fact, abstention from killing or *ahiṃsā*.¹⁰⁴

The following quotation from the *Dasaveyāliya* lacks an explicit reference to the analogy to oneself [b]:

"All living beings (*jīva*) without exception (*vi*) desire to live, not to be killed. Therefore, those without fetters (= the Jaina monks) avoid the dreadful [act of] killing."¹⁰⁵

Dasav 10.5, on the other hand, states the analogy but does not expressly apply it to the feeling of pleasure and pain, etc., i.e. lacks an explicit statement of [a]:

"He who ... deems all the six classes [of living beings] as equal to himself and embraces the five great vows (i.e. abstaining from killing living beings, etc.) ..., is a [true] monk."¹⁰⁶

Similarly *Sūy* I.11.33:

¹⁰² Cf. CAILLAT 1993: 218.

¹⁰³ *Āyār* I.4.2.5-6 (p. 19,1-8): *vayaṃ puṇa evaṃ āikkhāmo ...: savve pāṇā ... na hantavvā na ajjāveyyavvā na pariāveyyavvā na parighettavvā na uddaveyyavvā; ... āriya-vayaṇaṃ eyaṃ. ... patteyaṃ-patteyaṃ pucchissāmo: haṃ-bho pāvāyū! kiṃ bhe sāyaṃ dukkhaṃ uyāhu asāyaṃ? samiyā-paḍivanne yāvi evaṃ būyā: savvesiṃ pāṇānaṃ ... asāyaṃ ... mahab-bhayaṃ dukkhaṃ ti.*

¹⁰⁴ Besides, there are a number of passages in *Āyār* which may be expressing or intending the Golden Rule but are not sufficiently explicit or sufficiently clear (at least to me), e.g. I.1.7.1 (p. 5,22f); 3.1.1 (p. 13,10f); 3.2.1 (p.14,8-11); 3.3.1 (p. 15,18f); 5.5.4 (p. 25,20-24): "You are indeed precisely [like?] that [creature] of which you think that it may/should be killed! ... Therefore, one [should] not [be] a killer nor prompt others to kill."

¹⁰⁵ Dasav 6.11 (JĀS: 6.10 = § 273): *savva-jīvā vi icchanti jīviyaṃ na marijjimaṃ / tamhā pāṇa-vahaṃ ghoram nigganthaṃ vajjayanti naṃ //*

¹⁰⁶ ... *appa-same* (JĀS: *atta-°*) *manneja chap-pi kae / pañca ya phāse mahavvayāim ... je, sa bhikkhū //*

"Detached from worldly objects, one should wander about exerting oneself [to treat] all creatures in the world in analogy to [how one would want to be treated] oneself."¹⁰⁷

Dasav 4.10 (p. 15; JĀS § 64) also mentions concern (*dayā*)¹⁰⁸ — which in its turn is stated to presuppose knowledge, i.e. complete knowledge of what is living and sentient and what is not¹⁰⁹ — as leading to complete restraint (i.e. abstention from killing any living being). The immediately preceding verse 4.9 had used the expression *savva-bhūyappa-bhūya*, i.e. had characterized the Jaina ascetic as a person "for whom all beings are [like] himself", an expression which the *Cūrṇi*¹¹⁰ explains in terms of the Golden Rule.

As was pointed out already by SCHMIDT (1968: 655), the notion of "concern" (*dayā*) is also found in the brahmanical *Dharmasūtras*¹¹¹, and in the *Mahābhārata* there are not only frequent occurrences of *dayā*¹¹² but also several more or less explicit statements of the Golden Rule.¹¹³ Another point worth mentioning is that the expression *sarva-bhūtātma-bhūta*, which occurs in the *Dasaveyāliya*, is quite frequent in the *Mahābhārata*, also in connection with the motivation of *ahiṃsā*.¹¹⁴

¹⁰⁷ *virae gāma-dhammehiṃ je kei jagatī jagā / tesiṃ att'-uvamāyāe thāmaṃ kuvvaṃ parivvaē. Cf. also Sūy I.10.3; 11.9; 12.18.*

¹⁰⁸ Cf. also Āyār I.6.5.2 (p. 31,23) 8.3.2 (p. 35,13); Dasav 8.13c; 9.1.13a; Utt 5.30; 18.35; 20.48; 21.13 (*savvehī bhūehī dayānukampī*); 35.10; for occurrences in *Isibhāsiyāṃ* see YAMAZAKI/OUSAKA 1999: 70.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. DasavCu p. 161,1f: *sādhūnaṃ c'eva sampuṇṇā dayā jīvājīvavisesaṃ jānamānānaṃ, na u Sakkādāṇaṃ jīvājīvavisesaṃ ajānamānānaṃ sampuṇṇā dayā bhavai.*

¹¹⁰ DasavCu 160,6: *savvabhūtā savvajīvā, tesu savvabhūtesu appabhūto. kahaṃ? "jahā mama dukkhaṃ aṇiṭṭhaṃ iha, evaṃ savva-jīvānaṃ" ti kāmā pīdā ("dam?") no uppāyay ("pāei?").*

¹¹¹ GauDhS (1.)8.24 (BÜHLER: 8.23); BauDhS 2.(10.)18.10.

¹¹² Cp. STRAUSS 1911: 274f.

¹¹³ E.g., Mbh 12.221.43cd (*sarvabhūteṣvavartanta yathātmani dayāṃ prati*); 237.25 (*sarvāṇi bhūtāni sukhe ramante, sarvāṇi dukkhasya bhṛṣaṃ trasanti / teṣāṃ bhayōtpādāna-jāta-khedaḥ kuryān na karmāni ...*); 251.21 (*jīvitum yaḥ svayam icchet, kathaṃ so 'nyam praghātayet / yad-yad ātmana iccheta, tat parasyāpi cintayet //*); 13.114.6 (*ātmopamaś ca bhūteṣu*); 8 (*na tat parasya samādā(h)yād pratikūlaṃ yad ātmanaḥ*); 9 (*ātmaupamyena*); 116.21c-22b (*prāṇā yathātmano 'bhīṣṭā bhūtānāṃ api te tathā / ātmaupamyena gantavyaṃ ...*); 117.11 (*na hi prāṇāt priyataraṃ loke kiṃcana vidyate / tasmād dayāṃ naraḥ kuryād yathātmani tathā pare //*); 132.54-55 (*... na hinasti kadācana / ... sarvabhūteṣu sasneho yathātmani tathā pare*). Cf. STRAUSS 1911: 283; ALSDORF 1962: 589f; 1998: 863f; TÄHTINEN 1976: 45; HOUBEN 1999: 152.

¹¹⁴ E.g., Mbh 13.114.7; cf. STRAUSS 1911: 282-284. Cf. also MALINAR 1996: 196ff.

It would thus seem that *ahiṃsā*, or abstention from killing/hurting living beings, is motivated in the early Jaina and Buddhist sources (and also in post-vedic Hindu literature) by (at least) two significantly different arguments: 1. by pointing out its undesired or even dreadful effects in this life and, above all, in the yonder world or afterlife, and 2. by means of the Golden Rule. The first motivation is sometimes presented in forms which remind one very much of the scenery of the Bhṛgu story, emphasizing as they do the element of retribution in a form which comes close to the *lex talionis*, occasionally even suggesting the idea of revenge being taken by the victims. The main sentiment of this motivation is doubtless *fear*. As against this, the second motivation is entirely based on *empathy*. At first glance, the two motivations may appear utterly incompatible, the first looking like a "magico-ritualist taboo on life" (ALSDORF 1962: 571), the second being truly ethical. In view of the Bhṛgu story one may be inclined to follow ALSDORF (1962: 589) in considering the first, taboo-like motivation of *ahiṃsā* to be the original one, and the ethical one to be a later development, but in view of the unsolved problem of the "origin" of *ahiṃsā* and the equally unsolved problems of the relative chronology of the relevant pieces of practically anonymous literature I for one prefer to refrain from any judgement in this regard.

What I should, however, like to point out is that in spite of all the difference between the two motivations a closer analysis of the former may show that they are after all not entirely incompatible but may, ultimately, derive from a common background. In a sense, the idea implied in the Bhṛgu story that the victims will try to take revenge upon the eater or killer in the yonder world (or, for that matter, that congeners may do so even in this world) incontrovertibly presupposes the idea that the victims (or the congeners) react — emotionally and actually — upon injury inflicted upon them (or upon their relatives or congeners) in more or less the same way as one would oneself do. Just as one would dislike being injured or killed (or losing one's relatives), so too the victim (or its congeners). Just as one would long for retaliation, so too the victim (or its congeners). Thus, the idea of the victim taking revenge upon the killer in the yonder world presupposes at least an inkling of *empathy*, in the sense of sensing intuitively that the feelings of other creatures are basically similar to one's own feelings.¹¹⁵ It may seem somewhat strange to modern

¹¹⁵ I do not know to what extent this intuition includes already an element of *compassion* (as MEULI 1946: 250f suggests), but at any rate it would seem to constitute a basic precondition for genuine compassion.

Europeans that animals and even plants (let alone water or other elements) are presupposed to feel precisely like humans, but at least as far as the so-called higher animals are concerned some analogy in the fundamental issues of pain and dying is hardly disputable, and what do we know about how the "lower" ones, or plants for that matter, actually "feel"? Anyway, the decisive point is that the idea of the victim longing for revenge presupposes a certain degree of empathy or at least of understanding other creatures in analogy to oneself. This empathy may express itself as fear or just as embarrassment in connection with killing or injuring. When ritual protection against retaliation was, for whatever reason, abandoned or regarded as insufficient, fear may well have entailed real ahimsā. But it may be difficult to exclude the possibility that real ahimsā, as a basic element of a mode of life, emerged or was at least enhanced because embarrassment at killing, or empathy, gained momentum and developed into real empathy, conscious of itself, to which the ritualist escape was no longer acceptable (and, thanks to socio-economic changes, perhaps also no longer inevitable) and which expressed itself in the concept of concern (dayā) and in the Golden Rule.¹¹⁶

To investigate whether there were other strands in Vedic religion that may have contributed to this development is beyond the limits of this paper. The same holds good for a closer inquiry into the pertinent material found in early Hindu sources, first of all in the *Mahābhārata*, especially in connection with the above-mentioned term *sarvabhūtāmabhūta*, although precisely such an inquiry would doubtless have been a much more suitable contribution to this volume in honour of Professor HARA.

ABBREVIATIONS

AN	<i>Āṅguttaranikāya</i> (PTS ed.)
ĀpDhS	<i>Āpastambīya-Dharmasūtram</i> , ed. G. BÜHLER, Bombay ³ 1932.
AWL	Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur (Mainz), Abhandlungen der geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse

¹¹⁶ As T. VETTER suggests (oral communication), the practice of *ahimsā*, however motivated, may have turned out self-rewarding, leading as it does, according to passages like DN I 70, to "irreproachable internal happiness (*anavajja-sukha*)". This happiness, too, may be explained as the positive counterpart of embarrassment and to be due to the fact that in practising *ahimsā* one lives in conformity with what one's sense of empathy feels to be right.

Āyār	<i>Āyāraṅga</i> , ed. W. SCHUBRING, Leipzig 1910.
BauDhS	<i>Baudhāyana-Dharmasūtra</i> , ed. E. HULTZSCH, Leipzig ² 1922.
BEI	Bulletin d'études indiennes
BhāgP	<i>Bhāgavata-purāṇa</i> , Sacitram sarala-hindī-vyākhyā-sahitam. Gorakhpur ³ saṃvat 2013.
CPD	<i>Critical Pāli Dictionary</i> , begun by V. TRENCKNER, ed D. ANDERSEN et al. Copenhagen 1960ff.
Dasav	<i>Dasaveyāliya</i> , ed. W. SCHUBRING. In: W. SCHUBRING, <i>Kleine Schriften</i> , ed. K. BRUHN, Wiesbaden 1977: 119ff.
DasavCu	<i>Daśavaikālika-cūṇi</i> , Indore: Jainabandhumudraṇālaya 1933.
DN	<i>Dīghanikāya</i> (PTS ed.)
GauDhS	<i>Gautama-Dharmasūtra</i> , ed. G.B. KALE, Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series no.61. 1966. BÜHLER = G. BÜHLER, <i>The Sacred Laws of the Āryas</i> , pt. I: Āpastamba and Gautama. repr. Delhi 1969.
Jā	<i>Jātaka</i> , together with its Commentary, ed. V. FAUSBØLL, London 1977-96.
JĀS	Jaina Āgama Series (Bombay)
JB	<i>Jaiminīya-Brāhmaṇa</i> , ed. Raghu Vira and Lokesh Chandra, Delhi ² 1986.
Mbh	<i>Mahābhārata</i> , crit. ed. V. SUKTHANKAR et al., Poona 1933-59.
MN	<i>Majjhimanikāya</i> (PTS ed.)
MS	<i>Maitrāyaṇī-Saṃhitā</i> , es. L. v. SCHROEDER, repr. Wiesbaden 1970.
PDhp	<i>Patna-Dharmapada</i> , ed. G. ROTH in: H. BECHERT, <i>Die Sprache der ältesten buddhistischen Überlieferung</i> , Göttingen 1980: 97-135.
PTC	<i>Pāli Tipiṭakam Concordance</i> , ed. F.L. WOODWARD and E.M. HARE, London 1952ff.
PTS	Pāli Text Society
ŚB	<i>Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa</i> , ed. A. WEBER, repr. Vārāṇasī 1964.
Sn	<i>Suttanipāta</i> (quoted acc. to the verse numbers of the PTS ed.)
SN	<i>Samyuttanikāya</i> (PTS ed.)
Sūy	<i>Sūyagaḍaṅga</i> (JĀS ed.)
SūyT	Śīlāṅka, <i>Sūtrakṛtāṅga-ṭīkā</i> , in: <i>Ācārāṅgasūtram and Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtram</i> , with the <i>Niryukti</i> of Ācārya Bhadrabāhu Svāmī and the Commentary of śīlāṅkācārya, ed. Sāgarānandasūriji Mahārāja, re-ed. Muni JAMBUVIJAYAJI. Delhi 1978.
T	<i>Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō</i> (Buddhist Tripiṭaka in Chinese)
TB	<i>The Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa</i> with the commentary of Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara Miśra, ed. R. SHAMA SASTRY, repr. Delhi etc. 1985.
TS	<i>Taittirīya-Saṃhitā</i> , ed. V.Ś. SĀTVALEKAR, Pārḍī ² 1957.
Utt	<i>Uttarajjhayaṇāṃ</i> (JĀS ed.)
Uv	<i>Udānavarga</i> , ed. F. BERNHARD, Göttingen 1965.
Vin	<i>Vinaya</i> (PTS ed.)
WZKS	Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens.

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On the Expressions *chandaso āropema*, *āyataka gītassara*,
sarabhañña and *ārṣa*
 as applied to the 'Word of the Buddha' (*buddhavacana*)

D. SEYFORTH RUEGG, London

1. The Pali expressions *chandaso āropema* and *sakā nirutti*.

In a well-known and much-discussed passage of the *Cullavagga* in the Pāli Vinaya we read the following passage in which several expressions are notoriously uncertain denotation, or at least possessed of more than one possible meaning (v.33 = Vin ii.139; Nālandā ed., pp. 228-9):

*tena kho pana samayena yameḷutekulā nāma bhikkhū dve bhātikā honti
 brāhmaṇajātikā kalyāṇavācā kalyāṇavākkaraṇā / te yena bhagavā ten'
 upasaṃkamimṣu, upasaṃkamitvā bhagavantaṃ abhivādetvā ekamantaṃ
 nisīdimṣu / ekamantaṃ nisinnā kho te bhikkhū bhagavantaṃ etad
 avocuṃ: etarahi bhante bhikkhū nānānāma nānāgottā nānājaccā
 nānākulā pabbajitā / te sakāya niruttiyā buddhavacanaṃ dū senti /
 handa mayaṃ bhante buddhavacanaṃ chandaso āropemā ti / vigarahi
 buddho bhagavā: kathaṃ hi nāma tumhe moghapurisā evaṃ vakkhatha
 [...] / n' etaṃ moghapurisā appasannānaṃ vā pasāddāya pasannānaṃ vā
 bhiyyobhāvāya / atha khv etaṃ moghapurisā appasannānaṃ ceva appa-
 sadāya pasannānaṃ ca ekaccānaṃ aññathattāyā ti / atha kho bhagavā
 te bhikkhū anekapariyāyena vigarahitvā [...] bhikkhūnaṃ tadanucchavi-
 kaṃ tadanulomikaṃ dhammiṃ kathaṃ katvā bhikkhū āmantesi: na
 bhikkhave buddhavacanaṃ chandaso āropetabbaṃ / yo āropeyya, āpatti
 dukkaṭassa / anujānāmi bhikkhave sakāya niruttiyā buddhavacanaṃ
 pariyāpuṇitum ti /*

This rather enigmatic passage might be translated as follows:

'Then, further, there were at that time the monks called Yameḷutekula,
 a pair of brothers, of Brahman birth, whose voices were good, whose